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Abstract
In this paper, we present two methods which generalize static team theory to dy-
namic team theory, in the context of continuous-time stochastic nonlinear differential
decentralized decision systems, with relaxed strategies, which are measurable to dif-
ferent noisy information structures. For both methods we apply Girsanov’s measure
transformation to obtain an equivalent decision system under a reference probability
measure, so that the observations and information structures available for decisions,
are not affected by any of the team decisions.
The first method is based on function space integration with respect to products of
Wiener measures. It generalizes Witsenhausen’s [1] definition of equivalence between
discrete-time static and dynamic team problems, and relates Girsanov’s theorem to
the so-called “Common Denominator Condition and Change of Variables”.
The second method is based on stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The
team optimality conditions are given by a “Hamiltonian System” consisting of forward
and backward stochastic differential equations, and conditional variational Hamilto-
nians with respect to the information structure of each team member. Under global
convexity conditions, we show that PbP optimality implies team optimality. We also
obtain team and PbP optimality conditions for regular team strategies, which are mea-
surable functions of decentralized information structures.
In addition, we also show existence of team and PbP optimal relaxed decentralized
strategies (conditional distributions), in the weak∗ sense, without imposing convex-
ity on the action spaces of the team members, and their realization by regular team
strategies.
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1 Introduction
Static Team Theory is a mathematical formalism of decision problems with multiple Deci-
sion Makers (DMs) having access to different information, who aim at optimizing a common
pay-off or reward functional. It is often used to formulate decentralized decision problems, in
which the decision making authority is distributed through a collection of agents or players,
and the information available to the DMs to implement their actions is different. Static team
theory and decentralized decision making originated from the fields of management, organi-
zation behavior and government by Marschak and Radner [2–4]. However, its generalization
to dynamic team theory has far reaching implications in all human activity including science
and engineering systems, comprising of multiple components, in which information available
to the decision making components is either partially communicated to each other or not
communicated at all, and decisions are taken sequentially in time. Dynamic team theory and
decentralized decision making can be used in large scale distributed dynamical systems, such
as, transportation systems, smart grid energy systems, social network systems, surveillance
systems, networked control systems, communication networks, financial markets, etc.
In general, decentralized decision making is a common feature of any system consisting
of multiple local observation posts and control stations, where the acquisition of information
and its processing is shared among the different observation posts, and the DM actions at
the control stations are evaluated using different information, that is, the arguments in their
control laws or policies are different. We call, as usual, “Information Structures or Patterns”
the information available to the DMs at the control stations to implement their actions, and
we call such informations “Decentralized Information Structures” if the information available
to the DMs at the various control stations are not identical to all DMs. Early work discussing
the importance of information structures in decision making and its applications is found
in [2–7].
Since the late 1960’s several articles have been written on decentralized decision making
and information structures, and their applications in communication and queuing networks,
sensor networks, and networked control systems. Some of the early references are [1,5,6,8–28],
while more recent are [29–41]. Among these references the most popular mathematical for-
malism is that of “Static Team Theory”1 developed by Marschak and Radner [2–4]. The most
successful example is the discrete-time Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) decision problem
with two DMs having access to one step-delay sharing information pattern [10,12], with com-
mon and private information parts, where the explicit solution is obtained via completion of
squares and dynamic programming, respectively.
Due to the inherent difficulty in applying Marschak’s and Radner’s [2–4] Static Team
1Static in the terminology in [2–4] means all elements of the team problem are Random Variables; some
authors call such problems dynamic if the information structures depend on the decisions [1, 8, 9].
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Theory to stochastic discrete-time dynamic decentralized decision problems, two methods
are proposed over the years. The first method is based on identifying conditions so that
discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems can be equivalently reduced to static team
problems. The second method is based on applying dynamic programming, and identifying
conditions so that Person-by-Person (PbP) optimality2 implies team optimality. The first
method put forward in [8, 9], is based on using precedence diagrams to represent sequential
decisions and information structures in discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems, to
aid the analysis and computation of the optimal team strategies with partially nested in-
formation structures. In our opinion, even when the conditions suggested in these papers
hold, it is not clear whether this approach is tractable, or whether it will provide any insight
into specific discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems. Along the same direction, and
contrary to the earlier believe at the time, Witsenhausen in [1] claimed that for a broad
class of problems, discrete-time stochastic dynamic decentralized decision problems, with
finite decisions (including some continuous alphabet models), are no harder than Marschak’s
and Radner’s [2–4] static team problems, by showing that such problems are equivalent
to static problems. In Witsenhausen’s [1] terminology a discrete-time stochastic dynamic
decentralized decision problem is called “static”3 if it can be transformed to an equivalent
problem such that the observations available for any one decision do not depend on the
other decisions. The procedure is described in terms of “Common Denominator Condition”
together with “Change of Variables”. However, by careful reading of [Section 2.1, [1]], Wit-
senhausen’s analysis is restricted to discrete-time stochastic decentralized decision problems
without dynamics and hence, the conclusions obtained in [1] are only for a small class of
models. Moreover, no expression is given for the common denominator condition and change
of variables, which fascillitate the equivalence between the two problems.
With respect to the second method, PbP optimality and dynamic programming are often
used in real-time communication [16,22,30], in decentralized hypothesis testing [27,34], and
networked control systems [22, 32], for specific classes of discrete-time models and informa-
tion structures. The procedure is based on identifying an information state or sufficient
statistic, often employed in centralized stochastic control, to replace the observations avail-
able for decisions by a´ posteriory conditional distributions based on the observations [42,43].
However, identifying the information state and then applying dynamic programming are not
easy tasks, when one is faced with general information strctures and continuous alphabet
spaces (see for exampe [22]), while the question on whether PbP optimality implies team
optimality is difficult to resolve.
Following another research direction, recently, the authors invoked stochastic Pontrya-
gin’s maximum principle to derive team and Person-by-Person (PbP) optimality conditions
for stochastic differential decision systems with decentralized noiseless information struc-
tures [44], and decentralized noisy information structures [45], and computed the optimal
team decentralized strategies for various communication and control applications [46]. How-
ever, the mathematical anaysis in [44, 45] is based on strong formulation of the probability
space, which is restrictive in the sense that it is not easy to apply these optimality conditions
2PbP optimality treats the decentralized decision problem by fixing the strategies of all DMs except one.
3We believe the proper and more precise terminology is “Memoryless Observations”, rather than “Static”,
because it refers to the property of the observations only, while the unobserved state can be a random process
(in [1] the unobserved state is a RV).
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to noiseless feedback information structures and noisy information structures, unless certain
strong assumptions are imposed on the elements of the stochastic differential decentralized
decision systems.
The main objectives in this paper are the following.
(1) We present two methods, based on Girsanov’s theorem, which generalize Marschak’s
and Radner’s [2–4] static team theory to dynamic team theory. The first method is based on
function space integration of Wiener functionals, which we also relate to Witsenhausen’s [1]
common denominator condition and change of variables for continuous and discrete-time
dynamic team problems. The second method is based on stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum
principle, which allows us to derive both necessary and sufficient team optimality conditions.
(2)We show existence of relaxed team strategies (conditional distributions) under general
conditions, using a weak∗ topological space;
(3) We show, under global convexity conditions, on the Hamiltonian functional and
terminal pay-off, that PbP optimality implies team optimality;
(4) We show realizability of relaxed stratgies by regular strategies using the Krein-
Millman theorem.
Our approach is based on invoking Girsanov’s change of probability measure to define
an equivalent stochastic dynamical decentralized decision system under a reference proba-
bility measure, in which the distributed observations and information structures available
for decisions are not affected by any of the team decisions. Both methods donot impose any
restrictions on the information structures as in [44–46], and they apply to general models
and information structures, including nonclassical information structures [5, 6].
The first method is based on path integral of functionals of Brownian motion with respect
to products of Wiener measures. We show that this method generalizes Witsenhausen’s
[1] notion on equivalence between discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems which
can be transformed to equivalent static team problems, to continuous-time Itoˆ stochastic
nonlinear differential decentralized decision problems, to analogous discrete-time models,
and in addition we identify the precise expression of the common denominator condition
described in [1]. However, we point out certain limitations of this method in the context of
computing the optimal team strategies, for the case of large number of decision stages.
The second methods is based on stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principe; we derive
necessary conditions for team optimality given by a stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum prin-
ciple and sufficient conditions under global convexity assumptions. Moreover, we also show
that under the global convexity conditions, PbP optimality implies team optimality. This
method is much more general, and does not suffer from any limitations, in computing the
optimal team strategies, compared to the first method.
The results listed under (1)-(4) above, are derived in the context of the following general
continuous-time stochastic nonlinear differential decentralized decision systems (with relaxed
and regular team member strategies, and general noisy information structures).
4
inf
{
J(u1, . . . , uN) : (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ]
}
, (1)
J(u1, . . . , uN) = EPΩ
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), u1(t, y1), . . . , uN(t, yN))dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
, (2)
subject to stochastic differential dynamics with state x(·) and distributed noisy observations
{yi(·) : i = 1, . . . , N} satisfying the Itoˆ differential equations
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), u1(t, y1), . . . , uN(t, yN))dt
+ σ(t, x(t), u1(t, y1), . . . , uN(t, yN))dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (3)
dyi(t) = hi(t, x(t), u1(t, y1), . . . , uN(t, yN))dt+Di,
1
2 (t)dBi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
Here EPΩ denotes expectation with respect to a probability measure PΩ defined on an under-
lying measurable space
(
Ω,F
)
, while the elements of the team problem are the following:
J : the team pay-off or reward;
x : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rn : the unobserved state process;
W : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rm : the state process exogenous Brownian Motion (BM) process;
Bi : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rki : the ith distributed observation exogenous BM process, i = 1, . . . , N ;
yi : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rki : the ith distributed observation process generating the ith
information structure-the σ−algebra, Gy
i
0,t
△
= σ
{
yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N ;
ui : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Ai ⊆ Rdi : the ith decision process, i = 1, . . . , N ;
Uireg[0, T ] : admissible regular strategies of the ith decision process u
i, i = 1, . . . , N.
Although, in the above stochastic differential decentralized decision system we have assumed
regular team strategies, in the paper we consider relaxed team strategies, which are regular
conditional distributions uit(Γ) = q
i
t(Γ|G
yi
0,t) for t ∈ [0, T ] and ∀Γ ∈ B(A
i), i = 1, . . . , N , and
we obtain corresponding results for regular strategies as a special case of relaxed strategies.
Moreover, we apply the first method to a discrete-time generalization of (1)-(4), and we
demonstrate that both methods apply to arbitrary information structures, including non-
classical information structures [?]. We illustrate these points in our discussions.
According to the formulation of (1)-(4) and definition of admissible team strategies, each
distributed observation {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} generates the information structure of the ith
decision process {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} for i = 1, . . . , N . With respect to our introductory dis-
cussion, the stochastic system (3) may be a compact representation of many interconnected
subsystems, aggregated into a single state representation x ∈ Rn, each {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
corresponds to the observation process at the observation post “i”, and each {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]}
corresponds to the decision process applied at the “i” th control station. Since in the current
set up we have assumed ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ] then by definition, for each t ∈ [0, T ], the strategies
are of the form uit ≡ µ
i(t, {yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}), for i = 1, . . . , N , and hence the decision
processes utilize decentralized noisy information structures4.
4We will also describe more general decentralized noisy information structures.
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We call as usual, (1)-(4) a stochastic dynamic team problem, and a strategy uo
△
=
(u1,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ] which achieves the infimum in (1) a team optimal regu-
lar strategy. A PbP optimal regular strategy uo ∈ ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ] is defined by
J(u1,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1,o, . . . , ui−1,o, ui, ui+1,o, . . . , uN,o), ∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
Clearly, team optimality implies PbP optimality, but the reverse is not generally true. In
the context of team problems, PbP optimality is often of interest provided one can identify
conditions so that PbP optimality implies team optimality. For static team problems such
conditions, are derived in [3] and for exponential pay-off functionals in [20].
As we have mentioned earlier, our methodology is addressing stochastic dynamic team
problems is based on Girsanov’s change of probability measure, which allows us to intro-
duce an equivalent problem under a new reference probability space in which the distributed
noisy observations are signal free and/or the unobserved state process is drift free, and hence
they are not affected by any of the team decisions. Thus, we employ the powerful tools of
stochastic calculus such as, martingale representation theorem, stochastic variational meth-
ods, function space integration of functionals of Brownian motion with respect to Wiener
measures, to handle very general decentralized decision problems, with decision processes
having access to any combination of information structures.
Indeed, we apply the first method, based on function space integration, to the continuous-
time stochastic dynamic team problem (1)-(4), and we show that the so called “Common De-
nominator Condition” introduced in [1] to transformed, the simplified discrete-time stochas-
tic dynamic decentralized decision problem (with unobserved state a RV) to an equivalent
static one (in Witsenhausen’s terminology) is the existence, via Girsanov’s theorem [47], of
a Radon-Nikodym derivative between the initial and the reference probability measure, so
that under the reference probability measure the observations are not affected by any of the
team decisions. Moreover, we show that the so called “Change of Variables” in [1] is an
application of change of probability measure, expressing the initial pay-off under the refer-
ence probability measure. Therefore, we extend Witsenhausen’s [1] notion of equivalence
not only to general discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems, but also to continous-
time stochastic dynamic team problems. We also show that under the reference probability
measure, the pay-off of the team problem (1)-(4) is equivalently expressed via function space
integration with respect to the product of Wiener measures, and that, in principle, this
integration can be carried out precisely as in [48, 49], where examples of optimal, in mean-
square sense, finite-dimensional filters are derived. However, contrary to an intuitive belief,
we point out that this does not mean that such an equivalent problem is simpler, or that
static optimization theory and/or the static team theory of Marschak and Radner [2–4] can
be easily applied to the equivalent problem, even for the discrete-time analog of (1)-(4), in-
cluding Witsenhausen’s simplified model (without dynamics) described in continuous-time.
The reason is that the computation of the optimal team strategies can be quite intensive,
and often not tractable.
Then, we proceed with the second method to derive new team and PbP optimality con-
ditions; necessary conditions given by a stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle and
sufficient conditions under global convexity assumptions. Firstly, we apply Girsanov’s mea-
sure transformation [47] to transform (1)-(4) to an equivalent stochastic differential team
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game, under a reference probability measure, on which {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N are
independent Brownian motions, and independent of any of the team decisions. Secondly,
under the reference probability measure we show existence of team and PbP optimal relaxed
strategies, in the weak∗ sense. Thirdly, we invoke stochastic variational methods and the
Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space semi martingales to derive team and PbP
optimality conditions. We show that the necessary conditions for an admissible strategy to
be team optimal is the existence of an adjoint process in an appropriate function space sat-
isfying a backward stochastic differential equation, and that for each t ∈ [0, T ], the optimal
actions ui,ot satisfy almost surely, a pointwise conditional variational Hamiltonian inequality
with respect to the information structure {yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, with all other actions are kept
to their optimal values, for i = 1, . . . , N .
Under certain global convexity conditions we also show that the N conditional variational
Hamiltonian inequalities are also sufficient for team optimality. Moreover, we also show
that under the global convexity conditions, PbP optimality implies team optimality. The
new optimality conditions are given both under the reference probability measure, and also
under the initial probability measure via a reverse Girsanov’s measure transformation. The
Hamiltonian system of equations is precisely the analog of stochastic differential centralized
decision problems optimality conditions, extended to decentralized decision problems using
a dynamic team theory formulation.
One of the important aspect of our methodology is that the assumptions imposed to derive
existence of team and PbP optimal strategies, and necessary and sufficient team and PbP
optimality conditions are precisely the ones often imposed to derive analogous results for
stochastic partially observable control problems which presuppose centralized information
structures. However, “the challenge remains that of computing conditional expectations”
via the conditional variational Hamiltonians, which is not an easy task even for centralized
partially observable stochastic systems [58]. Therefore, examples will be presented elsewhere
as in [45], due to space limitations.
Throughout the paper, we develop the optimality conditions utilizing relaxed decentral-
ized strategies, and then we show how to recover analogous optimality conditions for regular
strategies.
Finallt, we point out that one may invoke alternative methods, such as the ones described
in [42,51–60], which are based on stochastic flows of diffeomprhisms, martingale representa-
tion theorem, and needle variations. Moreover, for the case of regular strategies with actions
spaces which are not necessarily convex, one can derive optimality conditions by considering
the generalized Hamiltonian system of equations, which includes also the second-order ad-
joint process [61] (see also [62]), provided the derivations are carried out under the reference
probability measure. The important point to be made regarding the results of this paper is
that, by invoking Girsanov’s measure transformation, the existence of team and PbP optimal
strategies, and the team and PbP optimality conditions for stochastic differential decentral-
ized decisions systems formulated using stochastic dynamic team theory, are derived similarly
to stochastic optimal control or decision problems, with centralized information structures,
and that only at the last step of the derivations, the issue of decentralization is accounted for,
leading to the conditional variational Hamiltonians with respect to the different information
structures.
We believe our lengthy introduction, together with the subsequent mathematical analysis,
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and results derived in the paper will help clarify certain statements found in the literature
concerning the application of Marschak’s and Radner’s Static Team Theory to stochastic
dynamic team problems, and aid in addressing other types of optimality criteria such as,
Nash Equilibrium, minimax games, etc. with decentralized information structures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the stochastic differential
decentralized decision problem and its equivalent re-formulations using the weak Girsanov’s
measure transformation approach. In this section, we also discuss the precise connection via
path integration between static team theory and dynamic team theory, thus generalizing [1]
to continuous-time stochastic dynamic team problems, and discrete-time stochastic dynamic
team problems with general unobserved state processes, and we also identify the exact ex-
pression of the common denominator conditions (Radon-Nikodym derivative). In Section 3,
we first show existence of solutions of the stochastic differential system, their continuous de-
pendence on u, and existence of team and PbP optimality using a weak∗ topological space of
regular conditional distributions. In Section 4, we derive the variational equations which we
invoke to derive the optimality conditions, both under the reference probability measure and
under the initial probability measure. In Section 5, we show how to obtain corresponding
results for regular strategies, and also how to realize relaxed strategies by regular strategies.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the presentation with comments on possible generalizations
of our results.
2 Dynamic Team Problem of Stochastic Differential
Decision Systems
In this section, we introduce the team theoretic formulation of stochastic differential de-
centralized decision systems, the information structures available to the DMs, which are
different and noisy, and the relaxed and regular strategies of the DMs. Then, we introduce
appropriate assumptions, and we invoke Girsanov’s change of probability to show that under
an appropriate choice of probability measure, the original stochastic differential decentral-
ized decision problem is equivalent to a new problem with distributed observations which
are independent, and independent of any of the team decisions.
Let ZN
△
= {1, 2, . . . , N} denote a subset of natural numbers, L(X ,Y) denote Linear
transformations mapping a linear vector space X into a vector space Y , and A(i) denote the
ith column of a map A ∈ L(Rn,Rm), i = 1, . . . , n.
Let
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
denote a complete filtered probability space satisfying
the usual conditions, that is, (Ω,F,P) is complete, F0,0 contains all P-null sets in F. Note
that filtrations {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} are monotone in the sense that F0,s ⊆ F0,t, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Moreover, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is called right continuous if F0,t = F0,t+
△
=
⋂
s>t F0,s, ∀t ∈ [0, T )
and it is called left continuous if F0,t = F0,t−
△
= σ
(⋃
s<t F0,s
)
, ∀t ∈ (0, T ]. Throughout we
assume that all filtrations are right continuous and complete, and defined by FT
△
= {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Consider a random process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} taking values in (Z,B(Z)), where (Z, d) is a
metric space, defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P). It can be
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shown that any such stochastic process which is measurable and adapted has a progressively
measurable modification [53]. Unless otherwise specified, we shall say a process {z(t) : t ∈
[0, T ]} is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted if the processes is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progressively
measurable.
C([0, T ],Rn) denotes the space of continuous real-valued n−dimensional functions defined
on the time interval [0, T ].
L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) ⊂ L2(Ω× [0, T ], dP× dt,Rn) ≡ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denotes the space of
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted random processes {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2Rndt <∞,
which is a sub-Hilbert space of L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)).
Similarly, L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)) ⊂ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rm,Rn))) denotes the space of {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted n×m matrix valued random processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞.
Next, we describe the set of admissible relaxed strategies. For each i ∈ ZN , let Ai ⊂
Rdi be closed and bounded (possibly nonconvex), and let B(Ai) denote the Borel subsets
of Ai. Let C(Ai) denote the space of continuous functions on Ai, endowed with the sup
norm topology, which makes it a Banach space. Let M(Ai) denote the space of regular
bounded signed Borel measures on B(Ai), having finite total variation. With respect to this
norm topology, M(Ai) is also a Banach space. It is well known that the dual of C(Ai) is
M(Ai). We are interested in M1(Ai) ⊂ M(Ai) the space of regular probability measures.
Using this construction, the DM strategies with decentralized information structures will
be described through the topological dual of the Banach space L1
Gy
i
T
([0, T ], C(Ai)), the L1-
space of Gy
i
T
△
= {Gy
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]]}− adapted C(A
i) valued functions, for i ∈ ZN . For
each i ∈ ZN the dual of this space is given by L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ],M(Ai)) which consists of weak∗
measurable Gy
i
T −adapted M(A
i) valued functions. For each i ∈ ZM the DM strategies are
drawn from L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ],M1(Ai)) ⊂ L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ],M(Ai)), the set of probability measure valued
Gy
i
T −adapted functions. Hence, we have the following definition of relaxed strategies.
Definition 1. (Admissible Relaxed Noisy Information Strategies)
The admissible relaxed strategies for DM i are defined by
Uirel[0, T ]
△
= L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i)), ∀i ∈ ZN , (5)
where Ai ⊂ Rdi, ∀i ∈ ZN are closed and bounded (possibly nonconvex).
An N tuple of relaxed strategies is by definition
U(N)rel [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ], M1(A
(N))
△
= ×Ni=1M1(A
i), A(N)
△
= ×Ni=1A
i.
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Thus, for any i ∈ ZN , given the information G
yi
T , {u
i
t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a stochastic kernel
(regular conditional distribution) defined by
uit(Γ) = q
i
t(Γ|G
yi
0,t), for t ∈ [0, T ], and ∀ Γ ∈ B(A
i).
Clearly, for each i ∈ ZN and for every ϕ ∈ C(Ai) the process∫
Ai
ϕ(ξ)uit(dξ) =
∫
Ai
ϕ(ξ)qit(dξ|G
yi
0,t), t ∈ [0, T ],
is Gy
i
T − progressively measurable. For each i ∈ ZN , the space L
∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ],M1(Ai)) is endowed
with the weak∗ topology, also called vague topology. A generalized sequence ui,α ∈ Uirel[0, T ]
is said to converge (in the weak∗ topology or) vaguely to ui,o, written ui,α
v
−→ ui,o, if and
only if for every ϕ ∈ L1
Gy
i
T
([0, T ], C(Ai))
E
∫
[0,T ]×Ai
ϕt(ξ)u
i,α
t (dξ)dt −→ E
∫
[0,T ]×Ai
ϕt(ξ)u
i,o
t (dξ)dt as α −→∞, ∀i ∈ ZN .
With respect to the vague (weak∗) topology the set Uirel[0, T ] is compact, and from here on
we assume that Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN has been endowed with this vague topology.
For relaxed strategies u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], we use the following notation for the drift coefficient
f(t, x, ut)
△
=
∫
A(N)
(
f(t, x, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN)
)
×Ni=1 u
i
t(dξ
i), t ∈ [0, T ), (6)
and similarly for {σ, h, ℓ} in (1)-(4).
Next, we define the set of admissible decentralized noisy information strategies of the
team members, called regular strategies, (deterministic measurable functions).
Definition 2. (Admissible Regular Noisy Information Strategies)
The admissible regular strategies for DM i are defined by
Uireg[0, T ]
△
= L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ]× Ω,Ai), ∀i ∈ ZN , (7)
the class of Gy
i
T −adapted random processes defined on [0, T ] and taking vlaues from the closed
bounded set Ai ⊂ Rdi, ∀i ∈ ZN . Note that if Ai is a closed, bounded and convex subset of
Rdi then Uireg[0, T ] is a closed convex subset of L
∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ]×Ω,Ai), ∀i ∈ ZN . An N tuple of
regular strategies is by definition
(u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ].
Notice that the class of regular strategies embeds continuously into the class of relaxed
decisions through the map u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] −→ δut(ω) ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. Clearly, for every f ∈
L1
Gy
T
([0, T ]× Ω, C(A(N))) we have
E
∫
[0,T ]×A(N)
f(t, ω, ξ)δut(ω)(dξ)dt = E
∫
[0,T ]
f(t, ω, u1t (ω), . . . , u
N
t (ω))dt.
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There are several advantages of using relaxed strategies. For example, if optimal regular
strategies exist from the admissible class U(N)reg [0, T ] ⊂ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] then the optimality condi-
tions of relaxed strategies can be specialized to the class of strategies which are simply Dirac
measures concentrated {uot : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ]. Thus, the necessary conditions for
team and PbP optimality for regular strategies follow readily from those of relaxed strate-
gies. Another advantage is the realizability of relaxed strategies by regular strategies, which
is often establsihed via the Krein-Millman theorem, without requiring convexity of A(N).
Both advantages are discussed in the paper.
Next, we state the basic assumptions on the stochastic differential dynamics and decen-
tralized observations, assuming relaxed strategies.
Assumptions 1. (Main assumptions)
The drift f , diffusion coefficients σ, and measurement functions hi, i = 1, . . . , N in (3), (4)
are Borel measurable maps:
f : [0, T ]× Rn×A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn),
hi : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rki, ∀i ∈ ZN ,
which satisfy the following basic conditions.
(A0) Ai ⊂ Rdi is closed and bounded, ∀i ∈ ZN .
There exists a K ∈ L2,+([0, T ],R) such that
(A1) |f(t, x, ξ)− f(t, z, ξ)|Rn ≤ K(t)|x− z|Rn uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A2) |f(t, x, ξ)|Rn ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn) uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A3) |σ(t, x, ξ)− σ(t, z, ξ)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K(t)|x− z|Rn uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A4) |σ(t, x, ξ)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn) uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A5) |hi(t, x, ξ)|Rki ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn) uniformly in ξ ∈ A
(N) ∀i ∈ ZN ;
(A6) |hi(t, x, ξ)− hi(t, z, ξ)|L(Rn ≤ K(t)|x− z|Rn uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N), ∀i ∈ ZN ;
(A7) f(t, x, ·), σ(t, x, ·), hi(t, x, ·), i = 1, . . . , N are continuous in ξ ∈ A(N), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×
Rn;
(A8) Di,
1
2 is measurable in t ∈ [0, T ], uniformly bounded, the inverse Di,−
1
2 exists and it is
uniformly bounded, ∀i ∈ ZN .
Often, for simplicity we shall replace (A5) by the following condition. There exist a K > 0
such that
(A5’) |hi(t, x, ξ)|Rki ≤ K, ∀(t, x, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n × A(N), ∀i ∈ ZN .
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2.1 Team Problem Under Reference Probability Space
In this section we formulate the stochastic team problem utilizing the Girsanov change of
measure approach, which is based on constructing a filtered probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
and Brownian motions {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} and {Bu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined
on it, such that {xu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} and {y(t) : t ∈ [0, T ] are the weak solution of (3) and
(4) with respect to relaxed strategies (with B replaced by Bu and PΩ by Pu). Moreover,
under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, {xu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a
weak solution of (3), while the observations {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, are independent Brownian
motions, which are independent of the team decisions, that is, they are fixed and unaffected
by ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Consequently, the information structures of each team member is
independent of u.
Let
(
Ω,F,P
)
be the canonical space of (x0, {W (t), {B
i(t) : i = 1, . . . , N} : t ∈ [0, T ]}) which
are defined by
(WP1) x(0) = x0: an Rn-valued Random Variable with distribution Π0(dx);
(WP2) {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rm-valued standard Brownian motion, independent of x(0);
(WP3) {Bi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N : Rki-valued, i = 1, . . . , N , mutually independent
Standard Brownian motions, independent of {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
We introduce the Borel σ−algebra B(C[0, T ],Rm)) on C([0, T ],Rm), the space of continuous
m−dimensional functions on finite time [0, T ], generated by {W (t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and let PW
its Wiener measure on it.
Similarly, we introduce the Borel σ−algebra B(C(0, T ],Rki)) on C([0, T ],Rki) generated by
{yi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and let Py
i
its Wiener mesure on it, for i = 1, . . . , N . We define the
Borel σ−algebra B(C(0, T ],Rk))
△
= ⊗Ni=1B(C(0, T ],R
ki)) on ⊗Ni=1(C(0, T ],R
ki) generated by
{y1(t), . . . , yN(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, k =
∑N
i=1 ki, and its Wiener product measure P
y △= ×Ni=1P
yi
on it.
Further, we introduce the filtration {FW0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} generated by truncations of W ∈
C([0, T ],Rm), and the filtration {Gy
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} generated by truncations of y
i ∈ C([0, T ],Rki), i =
1, . . . , N , and we define Gy0,t
△
= ⊗Ni=1G
yi
0,t, t ∈ [0, T ]. That is, for t ∈ [0, T ], F
W
0,t is the sub-σ-
algebra generated by the family of sets{
{W ∈ C([0, T ],Rm) : w(s) ∈ A} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t, A ∈ B(Rm)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence, {FW0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the canonical Borel filtration and F
W
0,T = B(C[0, T ],R
m)).
Define the canonical probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, called the reference
probability space by
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Ω
△
= Rn × C([0, T ],ℜm)× C([0, T ],Rk), (8)
F
△
= B(Rn)⊗ B(C([0, T ],Rm)⊗ B(C([0, T ],Rk), (9)
F0,t
△
= B(Rn)⊗FW0,t ⊗ G
y
0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], (10)
P
△
= Π0 × P
W × Py. (11)
A typical element of Ω is ω(t) =
(
x(0),W (t, ω), y(t, ω)
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
On the the reference probability space
(
Ω,F,P
)
we define the decentralized observations by
yi(t) =
∫ t
0
Di,
1
2 (s)dBi(s), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N. (12)
Clearly, under the reference probability measure P, the observations {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]},
are independent Brownian motions, and hence they are fixed and unaffected by ui, i =
1, 2, . . . , N , and consequently, the information structures of each player are independent of
u.
On the probability space
(
Ω,P
)
by Assumptions 1, (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), for any x(0)
with finite second moment, and team strategy u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] then {x
u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the
pathwise unique {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted C([0, T ],Rn),P− a.s. solution of
dxu(t) = f(t, xu(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x
u(t), ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (13)
Notice that uit ≡ q
i
t(dξ|G
yi
0,t) is adapted to the family {G
yi
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} which is fixed and
independent of u (since yi is a Brownian motion).
Next, for any u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] and for each observation process {y
i(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} defined on(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, we introduce the exponential functions
Λi,u(t)
△
=exp
{∫ t
0
hi,∗(s, x(s), us)D
i,−1(s)dyi(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
hi,∗(s, x(s), us)D
i,−1(s)hi(s, x(s), us)ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , (14)
and their products by
Λu(t)
△
=
N∏
i=1
Λi,u(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (15)
Under Assumptions 1, (A5), (A8) the processes {Λi,u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a super martingale
and by Itoˆ’s differential rule it is the unique {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted continuous solution
of the stochastic differential equation
dΛi,u(t) = Λi,u(t)hi,∗(t, x(t), ut)D
i,−1(t)dyi(t), Λi,u(0) = 1, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N. (16)
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Then for any admissible strategy u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], {Λ
u(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is also an
(
{F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]},P
)
-super martingale and satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dΛu(t) = Λu(t)
N∑
i=1
hi,∗(t, x(t), ut)D
i,−1(t)dyi(t), Λu(0) = 1, t ∈ [0, T ]. (17)
Given a u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] we define the reward of the team game under the reference probability
space
(
Ω,F,P
)
by
J(u)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
Λu(t)ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ Λ
u(T )ϕ(x(T )
}
, (18)
where ℓ : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,∞], ϕ : Rn −→ (−∞,∞] are chosen so that (18) is
finite.
Notice that under the reference probability measure P, the pay-off (18) with Λu(·) given
by (17), subject to the state process satisfying (13) is a transformed problem with obser-
vations which are not affected by any of the team decisions. It remains to show whether
this transformed problem is equivalent to the original stochastic differential decentralized
decision problem.
If we further assume that (A5’) holds, then {Λi,u(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is an
(
{F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]},P
)
-martingale for i = 1, . . . , N , and the team reward (18) subject to stochastic
constraints of xu(·),Λu(·) defined by (13), (17), respectively, is equivalent to the team game
(1)-(4) (with regular strategies replaced by relaxed strategies, and EPΩ repalced by Eu and
PΩ by Pu).
Indeed if (A5’) holds, by the
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
−martingale property of Λu(·) defined
by (17), it has constant expectation and hence,
∫
Ω
Λu(t, ω)dP(ω) = 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore,
we can introduce a probability measure Pu on
(
Ω, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
)
by setting
dPu
dP
∣∣∣
FT
= Λu(T ) (19)
Moreover, under the probability measure
(
Ω,F,Pu
)
, then {Bi,u : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a standard
Brownian motion defined by
Bi,u(t)
△
= Bi(t)−
∫ t
0
Di,−
1
2 (s)hi(s, x(s), us)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (20)
Hence, by (20) the observations of the team members are defined by
dyi(t) = hi(t, x(t), ut)dt+D
i, 1
2 (t)dBi,u(t) t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (21)
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and the state process {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is defined by (13) (its distribution is unchanged).
Thus, we have constructed the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
and Brow-
nian motion {B1,u(t), . . . , BN,u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined on it such that
{x(t), y1(t), . . . , yN(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are weak solutions, of (21), and (13). Moreover, under
the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, by using (19) into (18) then the team
problem reward is given by
J(u) = Eu
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
. (22)
Therefore, we have two equivalent formulations of the stochastic differential team game. The
one defined under probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
given by (13), (21), (22),
and the one defined under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
given
by (13), (17), (18), in which {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N} are Brownian motions.
One of the important aspects of this weak Girsanov formulation is that the probability
measure Pu and the observations Brownian motions {Bi,u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N
depend on u but the filtrations {Gy
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N are fixed a´ priori and they are
independent of u (although they are correlated and not generated by Brownian motions).
Girsanov’s approach is used extensively in the derivation of maximum principe for both
fully observed and partially observed centralized stochastic control problems with regular
strategies [42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 63], by working under the reference probability measure P, in
which the observations are Brownian motions.
In the above formulation we have imposed condition (A5’) so that {Λu(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is
an
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
-martingale; a sufficient condition for Λu(·) to be such a martingale
is the Novikov [47] condition, E exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}
<∞.
Equivalent Team Game Under Reference Probability Space-
(
Ω,F,P
)
Next, we define the equivalent team game under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, by considering the augmented state process {Λ, x} defined by (17), (13), and
reward (18).
Define the augmented vectors, drift, diffusion coefficients, and functions in the pay-off as
follows.
X
△
=V ector{Λ, x} ∈ R× Rn, B
△
= V ector{B1, B2, . . . , BN} ∈ Rk
△
= ×Ni=1R
ki,
y
△
=V ector{y1, y2, . . . , yN} ∈ Rk, W
△
= V ector{D
1
2B,W} ∈ Rk+m
F (t, X, u)
△
=
[
0
f(t, x, u)
]
, G(t, X, u)
△
=
[
Λh∗(t, x, u)D−
1
2 (t) 0
0 σ(t, x, u)
]
,
h(t, x, u)
△
= V ector{h1(t, x, u), . . . , hN(t, x, u)}, D(t) = diag{D1(t), . . . , DN(t)},
L(t, X, u)
△
= Λℓ(t, x, u), Φ(X)
△
= Λϕ(x).
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Then, under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F,P
)
the augmented state satisfies the
stochastic differential equation
dX(t) = F (t, X(t), ut)dt+G(t, X(t), ut)dW (t), X(0) = X0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (23)
The reward is given by
J(u) = E
{∫ T
0
L(t, X(t), ut)dt+ Φ(X(T ))
}
. (24)
Therefore, using the second method we shall investigate the equivalent team game under the
reference measure P described by (23) and (24), with augmented state X = V ector{Λ, x},
{Gy
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} a fixed filtration generated by Brownian motions, for i = 1, . . . , N , filtration
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} generated by Brownian motions and the initial condition, i.e. both filtra-
tions are independent of any of the team decisions. Indeed, under the reference probability
measure P we use the second method to derive team and PbP optimality conditions for the
stochastic differential decentralized decision problem (23), (24), by applying stochastic vari-
ational methods, the semi martingale representation tehorem and the Riesz representation
theorem for Hilbert space processes. This is the approach we consider in Section 4.
We are now ready to state the rigorous definitions of team optimality and PbP optimality.
Problem 1. (Team Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (22), state constraint (13),
observations (21), and the admissible relaxed noisy information strategies, the N tuple of
strategies uo
△
= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is called team optimal if it satisfies
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN), ∀u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], (25)
and its corresponding xo(·) ≡ x(·; uo(·)) (satisfying (13)) is called an optimal state process.
Under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
this problem is equivalent
to (23) and (24).
By definition, Problem 1 is a special case of stochastic dynamic games, in the sense that
there is only one reward or pay-off criterion, instead of an individual pay-off criterion for
each team member ui, i ∈ ZN . Thus, the decision making authority is distributed among
the N team members and their collective actions are evaluated based on a single reward.
Moreover, Problem 1 is a stochastic dynamic team problem with team members having
access to different information structures. An alternative approach to handle such problems
is to restrict the definition of optimality to the so-called PbP equilibrium as defined next.
Problem 2. (PbP Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (22), state constraint (13), ob-
servations (21), and the admissible relaxed noisy information strategies, the N tuple of strate-
gies uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is called PbP optimal if it satisfies
J˜(ui,o, u−i,o) ≤ J˜(ui, u−i,o), ∀ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , (26)
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where
J˜(v, u−i)
△
= J(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN).
Under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
this problem is equivalent to (23)
and (24).
However, for team problems PbP optimality is often of interest provided one can identify
sufficient conditions so that PbP optimality implies team optimality, much as is done in the
Static Team Theory of Marschak and Radner.
Remark 1. In some applications it might be appropriate to consider other variations of
decentralized optimality criteria such as, Nash-Equilibrium, minimax games, etc. For exam-
ple, robustness of centralized control systems is often dealt with via minimax techniques, and
risk-sensitive pay-off functionals [42]. These optimization criteria can be dealt with by using
the current Girsanov measure transformation.
2.2 Function Space Integration: Equivalence of Static and Dy-
namic Team Problems
In this section, we discuss the derivation of team and PbP optimality condition via the
first method, based on function space integration of functionals of Brownian motions with
respect to the product of Wiener measures. As we have elaborated in Section 1, we will
also generalize Witsenhausen’s equivalence between discrete-time static and dynamic team
problems [1], to an unobserved state which is a random processes. We will identify the exact
expression of the common denominator condition (described in [1]), and we will demonstrate
the limitations of applying this method to compute the optimal team strategies, in terms of
computational tractability, at least for problems with large number of decision stages.
Continuous-Time Stochastic Dynamic Team Problems.
We need the following assumption.
Assumptions 2. The Borel measurable diffusion coefficient σ in (3) is replaced by5
(A9) G : [0, T ] −→ L(Rn,Rn) (i.e. it is independent of (x, ξ) ∈ Rn ×A(N)), G−1 exists and
both are uniformly bounded;
(A10) There exists a K > 0 such that |G−1(t)f(t, x, ξ)|Rn ≤ K, ∀(t, x, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×A(N).
Under the additional Assumptions 2, by Girsanov’s theorem, we define the original
stochastic differential decision problem (22), (13), (21) (with σ(t, x, u) = G(t)) by con-
sidering two consecutive change of probability measures as follows.
We start with a probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, under which {(x(t), y(t)) :
t ∈ [0, T ]} are defined by
x(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
G(s)dW (s) ≡ x(0) + Ŵ (t), y(t) =
∫ t
0
D
1
2 (s)dB(s), (27)
5G can be allowed to depend on x.
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where {(W (t), B(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are independent standard Brownian motions (independent
of x(0)), and
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
)
are defined by (8)-(10).
Then we introduce the
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
-exponential martingale defined by
Υu(t)
△
= exp
{∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s), us)
(
G(s)G∗(s)
)−1
dx(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s))
(
G(s)G∗(s)
)−1
f(s, x(s))ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (28)
Therefore, we define the reference measure P on
(
Ω, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
)
by setting
dP
dP
∣∣∣
FT
= Υu(T ) (29)
Then, under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F,
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, the process
{W u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a Brownian motion defined by
dW u(t) = G−1(t)
(
dx(t)− f(t, x(t), ut)dt
)
.
Thus, {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a weak solution, which is pathwise unique, and {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]}−adapted C([0, T ],Rn),P−a.s., satisfying
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+G(t)dW
u(t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (30)
and {y(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is given by (27).
Next, we introduce the
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
-exponential martingale {Λu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
given by (17), and we define the original measure Pu on
(
Ω, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
)
by
dPu(ω) = Λu(T )dP(ω) = Λu(T ) Υu(T )dP(ω). (31)
Thus, under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, the processes {(x(t), y(t)) :
t ∈ [0, T ]} are solutions of (30) and (21).
Regarding the pay-off, given a u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], the team game pay-off under the probability
space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
is defined by
J(u)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
Λu(t)×Υu(t)ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ Λ
u(T )×Υu(T )ϕ(x(T )
}
, (32)
where E{·} denotes expectation with respect to the product measure P(dξ, dw, dy)
△
= Π0(dξ)×
W
Ŵ
(dw) ×Wy(dy), where WŴ (·) is the Wiener measure on the sample paths {Ŵ (t) : t ∈
[0, T ]} ∈ C([0, T ],Rn), and Wy(·) is the Wiener measure of the sample paths {y(t) : t ∈
[0, T ]} ∈ C([0, T ],Rk) of Brownian motion y(t) =
∫ t
0
D
1
2 (s)dB(s), t ∈ [0, T ], defined by (27).
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Moreover, by using (31) under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
the pay-off
(32) reduced to the pay-off (22).
Hence, we have shown that the stochastic differential decision problem with {(x(t), y(t)) :
t ∈ [0, T ]} satisfying (30), (21), and pay-off (22), is equivalent to the decision problem with
{(x(t), y(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]} independent Brownian motions, independent of any of the team
decisions, satisfying (27), and pay-off (32), and hence the transformed problem is “Static”
in Witsenhausen’s [1] terminology.
Now, we consider the equivalent transformed pay-off (32), and we integrate by parts the
stochastic integral terms appearing in Λu(·),Υu(·), and then we define
ℓ(t, ξ, Ŵ , y, u)
△
= Λu ×Υuℓ(t, x, u), ϕ(T, ξ, Ŵ , y, u)
△
= Λu ×Υuϕ(x), t ∈ [0, T ]. (33)
Then the transformed pay-off (32) is given by
J(u)
△
=
∫
Rn×C([0,T ],Rn)×C([0,T ],Rk)
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, ξ, {Ŵ (s), y(s), us : 0 ≤ s ≤ t})dt
+ ϕ(T, ξ, {Ŵ (t), y(t), ut : 0 ≤ t ≤ T})
}
Π0(dξ)×WŴ (dŴ )×Wy(dy) (34)
=
∫
C([0,T ],Rk)
{∫ T
0
V (t, {y(s), us : 0 ≤ s ≤ t})dt
+N(T, {y(t), ut : 0 ≤ t ≤ T})
}
Wy(dy), (35)
where (35) follows by Fubini’s theorem and by performing the integration with respect to the
product measure Π0(dξ)×WŴ (dŴ ). Note that the equivalent pay-off (35) is a function space
integral with respect to a Wiener measure; such function space integration is found in [48,49],
where new nonlinear finite-dimensional optimal, in the mean-square sense, filters are derived.
Moreover, expression (35) is precisely the continuous-time generalization of Witsenhausen’s
main theorem [Theorem 6.1, [1]], which is easily verified by comparing (35) and [equation
(6.4), [1]]. In fact, Υu(·).Λu(·) appearing in (31) is the common denominator condition,
and the representation of the pay-off as a functional of ω(t) = (x(0), Ŵ (t), y(t)), t ∈ [0, T ],
where y(·) is Brownian motion is the change of variables, in Witsenhausen’s [1] terminology.
Therefore, as stated in Section 1, applying the static team theory optimization to (35), as
in [20], to derive team and PbP optimality conditions will only be tractable for a very small
class of models. One way to compute the optimal team strategies via a tractable procedure
is to write the differential equations of {Λu(t),Υu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} and treat them as states
of the pay-off (32). However, this is a stochastic dynamic optimization problem, leading to
stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle, and hence it can not be dealt with via static
team theory.
Discrete-Time Stochastic Dynamic Team Problems.
Next, we consider a general discrete-time stochastic dynamic system operating over the
time period {0, . . . , T}, with observations collected at each time by N observation posts,
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each serving one of the N control station. Let NT0
△
= {0, 1, 2, . . . , T}, NT1
△
= {1, 2, . . . , T}
denote discrete time-index set.
We start with a reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ NT0 },P
)
, under which
{(x(t), ym(t)) : t ∈ ZT0 } are sequences of independent RVs, with x(0) having distribution
Π0(dx),
{
x(t) ∼ ζt(·)
△
= Gaussian(0, In×n) : t ∈ NT1
}
, and
{
ym(t) ∼ λmt (·)
△
= Gaussian(0, Ikm×km) :
t ∈ NT0
}
, for m = 1, . . . , N . Thus, ym(t) is the observation output at the mth observation
post at time t ∈ NT0 , for m = 1, . . . , N .
Let {F0,t : t ∈ NT0 } denote the filtration generated by the completion of the σ−algebra
σ{x(τ), y1(τ), . . . , yN(τ) : τ ≤ t}, t ∈ NT0 , and {G
ym
0,t : t ∈ N
T
0 } the filtration generated by
completion of the σ−algebra σ{ym(τ) : τ ≤ t}, t ∈ NT0 , for m = 1, . . . , N . Similarly, we
define by {Gy0,t : t ∈ N
T
0 } the filtration generated by completion of the minimum σ−algebra∨N
m=1 G
ym
0,t , t ∈ N
T
0 .
Next, we specify the information structures available as arguments of the control laws,
following the definitions given in [6]. For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, let Yt
△
=
{
(τ,m) ∈
{0, 1, . . . , t} × {1, 2, . . . , N}
}
. A data basis at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} is a subset A ⊆ Yt,
while Yt is the maximal data basis at time t. The array of vectors specified by A is denoted
by yA, where yA
△
=
{
ym(t) : (t,m) ∈ A
}
.
An information structure is the assignment to each (t, k) ∈ YT of a data basis at time t,
denoted by Yt,k. The interpretation is that the control applied by the kth station at time t
is based on
{
yµ(τ) : (τ, µ) ∈ Yt,k
}
. Thus, the argument of control applied by the kth station
at time t is {yµ(τ) : (τ, µ) ∈ Yt,k} (in [6] the information structure includes past controls as
well).
Thus, for a given Borel measurable mapping γkt (·), the control actions at the kth control
station are generated by
uk(t) = γkt
(
{yµ(τ) : (τ, µ) ∈ Yt,k
)
, t ∈ {0, 1 . . . , T}, k = 1 . . . , N. (36)
That is, γit(·) is the control law or strategy at time t, which generates the control actions
applied by the ith station, while its argument is the information structure.
Given an information structure, control station k is said to have “Perfect Recall” if for
t = 0, . . . , T − 1, Yt,k ⊆ Yt+1,k. Note that perfect recall means that a station that at
some time has available certain information will have available the same information at any
subsequent times.
An information structure is called “Classical” if the following two conditions hold: i) all
stations receive the same information (i.e. the information structures are independent of
k), ii) all stations have perfect recall. Thus, classical information structure implies that the
σ−algebras generated by the information structres at each control station over successive
times are nested (i.e. these generate filtrations).
Given the information structures, we denote the set of admissible strategies at the
kth control station at time t ∈ NT0 , by γ
k
t (·) ∈ U
k[t], their (T + 1)−tuple by γk[0,T ](·)
△
=
(γk0 (·), . . . , γ
k
T (·)) ∈ U
k[0, T ]
△
= ×Tt=0U
k[t], and γ[0,T ](·)
△
= (γ1[0,T ], . . . , γ
N
[0,T ](·) ∈ U
(N)[0, T ]
△
=
20
×Nk=1U
k[0, T ].
Write λt(·) =
∏N
m=1 λ
m
t (·), t ∈ N
T
0 , and y
△
= V ector{y1, . . . , yN}, h
△
= V ector{h1, . . . , hM}, D
1
2
△
=
diag{D1,
1
2 , . . . , DN,
1
2}. Consider the following measurable functions.
f(t, ·, ·) :×tτ=0 (R
n)×t,Nτ=1,k=1 (A
k
τ ) −→ R
n, t ∈ NT−10
hm(t, ·, ·) :Rn ×t,Nτ=1,k=1 (A
k
τ ) −→ R
km , t ∈ NT0 , m = 1, . . . , N.
For any admissible strategy uk(t) ≡ γkt ({y
µ(τ) : (τ, µ) ∈ Yt,k}, k = 1, . . . , N, t ∈ NT0 , we
define the following quantity (u ≡ (u1, . . . , uN)).
Θu0,t
△
=
t∏
τ=1
ζτ (G
−1(τ − 1)(x(τ)− f(τ − 1, x(0), . . . , x(τ − 1), u1(τ − 1), . . . , uN(τ − 1))))
|G(τ − 1)|ζτ(x(τ))
.
λτ (D
− 1
2 (τ)(y(τ)− h(τ, x(τ), u1(τ), . . . , uN(τ))))
|D
1
2 (τ)|λτ (y(τ))
, t ∈ NT1 . (37)
Θu0,0
△
=
λ0(D
− 1
2 (0)(y(0)− h(0, x(0), u1(0), . . . , uN(0))))
|D
1
2 (0)|λ0(y(0))
.
Under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ NT0 },P
)
the discrete-time team pay-
off is defined by
J(u1, . . . , uN)
△
=E
{
Θu0,T (x(0), u
1(0), . . . , uN(0), y(0), . . . , x(T ), u1(T ), . . . , uN(T ), y(T ))
.
( T−1∑
t=0
ℓ(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) + ϕ(x(T ))
)}
(38)
=
∫ {
Θu0,T (x(0), u
1(0), . . . , uN(0), y(0), . . . , x(T ), u1(T ), . . . , uN(T ), y(T ))
.
( T−1∑
t=1
ℓ(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) + ϕ(x(T ))
)}
Π0(dx(0)).λ0(y(0)).
T∏
t=1
ζt(x(t)).λt(y(t))dx(t).dy(t). (39)
=
∫
L(u1(0), . . . , uN(T ), . . . , u1(T ), . . . , uN(T ), x(0), . . . , x(T ), y(0), . . . , y(T ))
Π0(dx(0)).λ0(y(0)).
T∏
t=1
ζt(x(t)).λt(y(t))dx(t).dy(t). (40)
The team problem is defined by
inf
{
J(γ[0,T ]) : γ[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ]
}
. (41)
This is the transformed equivalent stochastic team problem. The initial stochastic dynamic
team problem is introduced as follows.
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It can be shown that {Θu0,t : t ∈ N
T
0 } is an
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ NT0 },P
)
−martingale, and
hence
∫
Θu0,t(ω)dP(ω) = 1. Therefore, we can define a probability measure P
u on
(
Ω, {F0,t :
t ∈ NT0 }
)
by setting
dPu
dP
∣∣∣
F0,t
= Θ0,t, t ∈ N
T
0 (42)
Then under this probability measure Pu, the processes defined by
wu(t)
△
= G−1(t− 1)
(
x(t)− f(t− 1, x(0), x(1), . . . , x(t− 1), u1(t− 1), . . . , uN(t− 1))
)
, t ∈ NT1 ,
(43)
bm,u(t)
△
= Dm,−
1
2 (t)
(
ym(t)− hm(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t))
)
, t ∈ NT0 , m = 1, . . . , N, (44)
are two sequences of independent normally distributed RVs with densities, ζt(·), t ∈ NT1 , and
λmt (·), t ∈ N
T
0 , m = 1, . . . , N , respectively.
Therefore, under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ NT0 },P
u
)
, the discrete-time stochas-
tic team problem has state and observations given by
x(t + 1) =f(t, x(0), x(1), . . . , x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) +G(t)wu(t+ 1), x(0) = x0, t ∈ N
T−1
1 ,
(45)
ym(t) =hm(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) +Dm,
1
2 (t)bm,u(t), t ∈ NT0 , m = 1, . . . , N. (46)
Thus, for any admissible team strategy u ≡ γ[0,T−1] ∈ U(N)[0, T ], under measure Pu the team
pay-off is
J(u) =Eu
{ T−1∑
t=0
ℓ(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) + ϕ(x(T ))
}
, inf
{
J(γ[0,T ]) : γ[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ]
}
.
(47)
Therefore, we have shown that the dynamic team problem (45), (46) with pay-off (47) can be
transformed to the equivalent problem (static problem in the terminology of Witsenhausen
[1]) with pay-off (39), where the sequences {x(t), y(t) : t ∈ NT0 } are independent, sequences,
distributed according to x(0) ∼ Π0(dx), x(t) ∼ ζt(·), t ∈ NT1 , y
m(t) ∼ λmt (·), t ∈ N
T
0 , m =
1, . . . , N .
Consequently, we conclude that under appropriate conditions (for example those in [3, 20]),
we can apply static team optimality conditions. Indeed, we can invoke any of Theorems
found in [20]. We illustrate this point by stating one such theorem from [20], when all
control stations do not have perfect recall (the rest are also applicable).
Theorem 1. Suppose none of the control stations have perfect recall. Assume the following
conditions hold.
(S1) L : ×T,Nt=0,k=0(A
k
t )××
T
t=0(R
n) −→ R is Borel measurable;
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(S2) L(·, x(0), . . . , x(T ), y(0), . . . , y(T )) is convex and differentiable uniformly in
(x(0), y(0), . . . , x(T ), y(T )) ∈ ×Ti=0(R
n+k);
(S3) inf
{
J(γ[0,T ]) : γ[0,T ] ∈ U(N)[0, T ]
}
> −∞;
(S4) There exists a γo[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ] such that J(γo[0,T ]) <∞;
(S5) For all γ[0,T ] ∈ U(N)[0, T ] such that J(γ[0,T ]) <∞, the following holds
E
{ N,T∑
k=1,t=0
Luk(t)(γ
o
[0,T ], x(0), . . . , x(T ), y(0), . . . , y(T ))
.
(
γkt − γ
k,o
t
)}
≥ 0, ∀γ[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ]. (48)
Then γo[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ] is a team optimal strategy. If in addition,
L(·, x(0), . . . , x(T ), y(0), . . . , y(T )) is strictly convex, P−a.s., then γo[0,T ] ∈ U
(N)[0, T ] is unique
P−a.s.
Proof. Since none of the control stations have perfect recall, and (t, k) ∈ {0, . . . , T} ×
{1, . . . , N}, there are (T + 1)N policies. Since, under the reference measure P the infor-
mation structures are independent of any of the team decisions, then under the reference
measure the problem is equivalent to a static team problem. By the above construction, we
can apply static team theory to the equivalent pay-off, i.e. [Theorem 2, [20]] is applicable.
Notice that by using the fact that Radon-Nykodym derivative Θu0,t(·), ∀t ∈ N
T
0 is an
exponential function then we can expressed (48) under the initial probability measure Pu.
Moreover, it we can show that (48) implies the following component wise conditional varia-
tional inequalities.
E
{
Luk(t)(u
o(0), . . . , uo(T ), x(0), . . . , x(T ), y(0), . . . , y(T ))|{ym(τ) : (τ, µ) ∈ Yt,k}
}
.
(
uk(t)− uk,o(t)
)
≥ 0, ∀uk(t) ∈ Akt , P− a.s., k = 1, . . . , N, t = 0, . . . , T. (49)
Furthermore, (49) can be expressed under the original probability measure Pu
o
as well.
Therefore, for discrete-time team problems we have extended Witsenshausen’s equiv-
alence of static and dynamic team problems, to observations which are functions of an
unobserved process with memory (rather than a RV), and we have identified the “Common
Denominator Condition and Change of Variables”. Although, the above method appears
feasible, to compute the optimal team strategies using this procedure is expected to be
computational intensive for large number of decision stages T and large number of con-
trol stations N . This is the reason why we pursue the second method based on stochastic
Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
Next, we apply the static team optimality conditions to the Witsenhausen counter ex-
ample described in [5]. This is a two-stage stochastic control problem is described by the
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following equations and pay-off.
State Equations:
x1 = x0 + u1, x2 = x1 − u2, x0 ∼ p0(·) (50)
Output Equations:
y0 = x0, y1 = x1 + v, v ∼ λv(·) (51)
Admissible Strategies:
u1 = γ1(y0), u2 = γ2(y1) (52)
Pay-Off:
J(γ∗1 , γ
∗
2)
△
= inf
(γ1(y0),γ2(y1))
J(γ1, γ2), J(u1, u2)
△
= Eu1,u2
{
k2
(
u1
)2
+
(
x2
)2}
, (53)
where (γ1, γ2) are measurable functions, x0 is a Random Variable with known probability
density function p0(·), and v is a Random noise term with a known probability density
function λv(·), both having zero mean and finite second moments, and x0 independent of v.
The objective is to find (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) which minimizes J(γ1, γ2). The information pattern is
nonclassical since y0 is known to the control u1 at the first stage but it is not known to the
control u2 at the second stage. This prolem remains unsolved since 1968, although several
paper have been written on it.
Under the reference probability measure P, in which y1 is distributed according to λv(·), the
equivalent pay-off is
J(u0, u1) = E
{λv(y1 − x0 − u1)
λv(y1)
(
k2(u1)
2 + (x0 + u1 − u2)
2
)}
. (54)
Applying static team theory, we have
∂
∂u1
E
{λv(y1 − x0 − u1)
λv(y1)
(
k2(u1)
2 + (x0 + u1 − u
∗
2)
2
)
|y0
}
|u1=u∗1 = 0, (55)
∂
∂u2
E
{λv(y1 − x0 − u∗1)
λv(y1)
(
k2(u∗1)
2 + (x0 + u
∗
1 − u2)
2
)
|y1
}
|u2=u∗2 = 0. (56)
Suppose v is Gaussian distribited N(0, 1). Then, we deduce, after elementary calculations,
that under the initial probability measure Pu1,u2 , the optimal control strategies (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) are
given by the following expressions.
γ∗1(y0) =−
1
2k2
Eγ
∗
1 ,γ
∗
2
{(
y1 − x1
)(
x1 − γ
∗
2(y1)
)2
|y0
}
−
1
k2
Eγ
∗
1 ,γ
∗
2
{
x1 − γ
∗
2(y1)|y0
}
(57)
=−
1
2k2
Eγ
∗
1 ,γ
∗
2
{(
y1 − x0 − γ
∗
1(y0)
)(
x0 + γ
∗
1(y0)− γ
∗
2(y1)
)2
|y0
}
−
1
k2
Eγ
∗
1 ,γ
∗
2
{
x0 + γ
∗
1(y0)− γ2(y1)|y0
}
, (58)
γ∗2(y1) =E
γ∗1
{
x1|y1
}
(59)
=Eγ
∗
1
{
x0|y1
}
+ Eγ
∗
1
{
γ∗1(y0)|y1
}
. (60)
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These are the equations which give the optimal two-stage decision strategies. One may
proceed further to compute the conditional density px1|y1(x1|y1), and then substitute (59)
into (58) to obtain a nonlinear equation in terms of γ∗1(y0).
3 Existence of Relaxed Team Optimal Strategies
In this section we consider the augmented systems of previous section, and we show contin-
uous dependent of the soloutions on u. This property is required when we invoke the semi
martingale representation for Hilbert space processes to obtain the variational equation of
the augmented system. Moreover, we introduce additional assumptions on ℓ, ϕ and we also
show existence of team and PbP optimal strategies.
Let B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) denote the space of {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}-adapted Rn+1− valued
second order random processes endowed with the norm topology ‖ · ‖ defined by
‖ X ‖2
△
= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|X(t)|2Rn+1.
Next, we show existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on u.
Lemma 1. (Existence and Continuous Dependence of Solutions)
Suppose Assumptions 1, (A0)-(A4), (A5’), (A6)-(A8) hold. Then for any F0,0-measurable
initial state x0 having finite second moment, and any u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], the following hold.
(1) System (23) has a unique solution X ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) having a continuous
modification, that is, X ∈ C([0, T ],Rn+1), P−a.s. Moreover, Λu(t) ∈ Lp(Ω,F0,t,P;R), ∀t ∈
[0, T ] for any finite p, and also Λu ∈ L∞(Ω,F0,t,P;R), ∀t ∈ [0, T ];
(2) The solution of system (23) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that,
as ui,α
v
−→ ui,o in Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , then X
α s−→ Xo in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)).
Proof. (1). We consider X = (Λ, x) and we show the statements component wise. The proof
regarding x is standard and can be shown using the Banach fixed point theorem, hence it is
ommitted. Regarding Λu which satisfies (17), by the conditions (A5’), (A8) we deduce that
P{
∫ T
0
|D−
1
2 (t)h(t, x(t), ut)|
2
Rkdt < ∞} = 1, hence by [47] there exists a unique non-negative
continuous solution Λu(t) =
∏N
i=1 Λ
i,u(t), where Λi,u(·) is given by (14). Next, we show that
Λu ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)).
Define
τn
△
= inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∫ t
0
h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s) ≥ n
}
.
By the integral solution of (17) (obtained by Itoˆ’s formulae), and taking t = τn we have
Λu(τn) = 1 +
∫ τn
0
Λu(s)h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s). (61)
Taking the expectation of both sides we obtain
E
{
Λu(τn)
}
= 1. (62)
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But τn −→ T as n −→ ∞, P − a.s. Since Λu(·) is nonnegative, letting n −→ ∞ and using
Fatou’s Lemma we have
E lim inf
n−→∞
Λu(τn) ≤ lim inf
n−→∞
EΛu(τn) = 1. (63)
Hence,
E
{
Λu(T )
}
≤ 1. (64)
Now,
|Λu(t)|2 =exp
{
2
∫ t
0
h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s)−
2
2
∫ t
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}
=exp
{
2
∫ t
0
h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s)−
4
2
∫ t
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}
× exp
{∫ t
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}
. (65)
Using (A5’), (A8) then there exists a K > 0 such that
|Λu(t)|2 ≤ exp{K2.T} exp
{
2
∫ t
0
h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s)−
4
2
∫ t
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}
(66)
By (64) which also holds for t ∈ [0, T ] instead of T and by replacing h∗(t, x, u) by 2h∗(t, x, u)
then we obtain
E|Λu(t)|2 ≤ exp{K2.T}E
{
exp
{
2
∫ t
0
h∗(s, x(s), us)D
−1(s)dy(s)
−
4
2
∫ t
0
|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rkds
}}
≤ exp{K2.T}.1 (67)
This shows that Λu ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)). The same procedure can be used to show that
Λu(t) ∈ Lp(Ω,F0,t,P;R), ∀t ∈ [0, T ] for any finite p.
Since Λu(·) is an FT -martingale (with right continuous trajectories) then |Λu(·)|2 is an
FT -submartingale with right continuous trajectories. Therefore, we can apply Doob’s Lp-
inequality for p = 2 to obtain
P
{
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Λu(t)|2 > n
}
≤
E|Λu(T )|4
n2
≤
1
n2
K, K > 0
where the last inequality follows from Λu(t) ∈ Lp(Ω,F0,t,P;R), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and hence for
p = 4, Let ∆n
△
=
{
ω ∈ Ω : supt∈[0,T ] |Λ
u(t, ω)|2 > n
}
, then
∞∑
n=1
P
{
∆n
}
≤ K.
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
<∞.
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Define ∆∗
△
= lim∆n =
⋂∞
k=1
⋃∞
n=k∆n ≡ {∆n i.o.}. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma (first part)
we have, P
{
∆n i.o.
}
= 0. This means that P − ess supω∈Ω supt∈[0,T ] |Λ
u(t, ω)|2 < M for
some finite M > 0.
(2) Since the class of policies Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN is compact in the vague topology, then
×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ] is also compact in this topology. Utilizing this observation the proof regarding
x is identical to that of [50], Lemma 3.1.
Next, we consider the second part asserting the continuity of u to solution map u −→ Λ.
Let {{ui,α : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, uo} be any pair of strategies from U(N)rel [0, T ] × U
(N)
rel [0, T ] and
{xα, xo}, {Λα,Λo} denote the corresponding pair of solutions of the system (23). Let ui,α
v
−→
ui,o in Uirel[0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N . We must show that Λ
α s−→ Λo in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)). By
the definition of solution to (17), then
Λα(t)− Λo(t) =
∫ t
0
{
Λα(s)− Λo(s)
}
h∗(s, xo(s), uos)D
−1(s)dy(s)
+
∫ t
0
Λα(s)
{
h∗(s, xα(s), uαs )− h
∗(s, xo(s), uos)
}
D−1(s)dy(s), t ∈ [0, T ]
=
∫ t
0
{
Λα(s)− Λo(s)
}
h∗(s, xo(s), uos)D
−1(s)dy(s) + eα1 (t) + e
α
2 (t), (68)
where
eα1 (t)
△
=
∫ t
0
Λα(s)
{
h∗(s, xα(s), uαs )− h
∗(s, xo(s), uαs )
}
D−1(s)dy(s)
eα2 (t)
△
=
∫ t
0
Λα(s)
{
h∗(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
}
D−1(s)dy(s).
From (68) using Doobs martingale inequality, it follows that there exists constants C1, C2 > 0
such that
E|Λα(t)− Λo(t)|2 ≤4C1E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, xo(s), uos)|
2
Rkds
+ C2
(
E|eα1 (t)|
2
Rk + E|e
α
2 (t)|
2
Rk
)
. (69)
Clearly, by Assumptions 1, (A6), (A7) we also obtain
E|eα1 (t)|
2
Rk ≤4 E
∫ t
0
|Λα(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xα(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds
≤4 E
∫ t
0
K2(s) |Λα(t)|2 |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds, (70)
E|eα2 (t)|
2
Rk ≤4 E
∫ t
0
|Λα(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds. (71)
Define τn
△
= inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : |D−
1
2 (t)h(t, xo(t), uot |
2
Rk > n
}
. Using this stopping time in (69)
27
we have
E|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2 ≤ 4C1 E
∫ t∧τn
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, xo(s), uos)|
2
Rkds
+ 4C2 E
∫ t∧τn
0
K2(s) |Λα(s)|2 |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds
+ 4C2 E
∫ t
0
|Λα(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(72)
Hence,
E|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2 ≤ 4nC1 E
∫ t∧τn
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2ds
+ 4C2 E
∫ t∧τn
0
K2(s) |Λα(s)|2 |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds
+ 4C2 E
∫ t∧τn
0
|Λα(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(73)
It is easy to see that this inequality is the same as the following one
E
{
|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2
}
≤ nC1
∫ t∧τn
0
E
{
|Λα(s ∧ τn)− Λ
o(s ∧ τn)|
2
}
ds
+ 4C2 E
∫ t∧τn
0
K2(s) |Λα(s)|2 |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds,
+ 4C2 E
∫ t∧τn
0
|Λα(t)|2 |D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(74)
Applying Gronwall Lemma to (74) we obtain
E
{
|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2
}
≤ 4nC1
∫ t∧τn
0
E
{
|Λα(s ∧ τn)− Λ
o(s ∧ τn)|
2
}
ds
+ 4C2E
∫ T
0
K2(s) |Λα(s)|2 |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds
+ 4C2 E
∫ T
0
|Λα(t)|2 |D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(75)
giving
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2 ≤ 4C2 exp{4nC1T} E
∫ T
0
|Λα(s)|2
(
K2(s) |xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rn
+ |D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rk
)
ds. (76)
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Since by part (1), P− ess supω∈Ω supt∈[0,T ] |Λ
α(t, ω)|2 < M for some finite M > 0, applying
this in (76) we deduce the following bound.
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2 ≤ 4C2 exp{4nC1T}.P− ess sup
ω∈Ω
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Λα(t, ω)|2
.
{∫ T
0
K2(s) E|xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds+ E
∫ T
0
|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds
}
≤ 4C2 exp{4nC1T}.M.
{∫ T
0
K2(s) E|xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rnds
+ E
∫ T
0
|D−
1
2 (s)
(
h(s, xo(s), uαs )− h(s, x
o(s), uos)
)
|2Rkds
}
. (77)
Now, utilizing (1), letting α −→∞ and recalling that xα converges to xo inB∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)),
the first integrand in the right hand side of (77) converge to zero for almost all s ∈
[0, T ],P−a.s. Also, by virtue of vague convergence ui,α
v
−→ ui,o, and the uniform conti-
nuity assumption (A7) on h(t, x, ·), the second integrand in the right hand side of (77)
converge to zero for almost all s ∈ [0, T ],P−a.s. Since by our assumptions the integrands are
dominated by integrable functions, by Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem we obtain
lim
α→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Λα(t ∧ τn)− Λ
o(t ∧ τn)|
2 = 0, for every n ∈ N. (78)
Since
P
{
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|D−
1
2 (t)h(t, xo(t), uot )|
2
Rn > n
}
−→ 0 as n −→∞,
it is clear that limn−→∞ τn = T. Hence, Λ
α converges in the mean square sense on [0, T ).
Next, we address the question of existence of team and PbP optimal strategies.
We need the following assumptions.
Assumptions 3. The functions ℓ and ϕ associated with the pay-off (24) are Borel measurable
maps:
ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,+∞], ϕ : Rn −→ (−∞,+∞].
satisfying the following basic conditions:
(B1) x −→ ℓ(t, x, ξ) is continuous on Rn for each t ∈ [0, T ], uniformly with respect to
ξ ∈ A(N);
(B2) ∃ h ∈ L+1 ([0, T ],R) such that for each t ∈ [0, T ], |ℓ(t, x, ξ)| ≤ h(t)(1 + |x|
2
Rn);
(B3) x −→ ϕ(x) is continuous on Rn and ∃ c0, c1 ≥ 0 such that |ϕ(x)| ≤ c0 + c1|x|2Rn.
Using the results of Lemma 1 in the next theorem we establish existence of team and
PbP optimal strategies uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] for Problem 1, 2.
29
Theorem 2. (Existence of Team Optimal Strategies) Consider Problem 1 and suppose As-
sumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then there exists a team decision uo
△
= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈
U(N)rel [0, T ] at which J(u
1, u2, . . . , uN) attains its infimum.
Existence also holds for PbP decisions of Problem 2.
Proof. Since the class of control policies UNrel[0, T ] is compact in the vague topology, it suffices
to prove that J(·) given by (24) is lower semicontinuous with respect to this topology. Sup-
pose ui,α
v
−→ ui,o in Uirel[0, T ] for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and let {X
α, Xo} ⊂ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1))
denote the solutions of equation (23) corresponding to the sequence {{ui,α : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, uo} ⊂
U(N)rel [0, T ]. Then by Lemma 1, along a subsequence if necessary, x
α s−→ xo inB∞F0,T ]([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn))
and Λα
s
−→ Λo in B∞F0,T ]([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)) Firstly, in view of the strong convergence, along
a subsequence if necessary, xα(T ) −→ xo(T ),Λα(T ) −→ Λo(T ),P−a.s. By the conti-
nuity of ϕ, Assumptions 3, (B3), we have ϕ(xo(T )) ≤ lim infα ϕ(x
α(T )),P − a.s. and
also get Λo(T )ϕ(xo(T )) ≤ lim infα Λ
α(T )ϕ(xα(T )),P − a.s. Hence, E
{
Λo(T )ϕ(xo(T ))
}
≤
E
{
lim infα Λ
α(T )ϕ(xα(T ))
}
. Thus, it follows from Assumptions 3, (B3), by applying Fa-
tou’s lemma that
E{Λo(T )ϕ(xo(T ))} ≤ lim inf
n
E
{
Λα(T )ϕ(xα(T ))
}
. (79)
Next, consider the integral pay-off; it can be shown that
E
∫
[0,T ]
Λo(t) ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )dt =E
∫
[0,T ]
Λo(t) ℓ(t, xo(t), uot − u
α
t )dt+ E
∫
[0,T ]
Λα(t) ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )dt
+ E
∫
[0,T ]
(
Λo(t)ℓ(t, xo(t), uαt )− Λ
α(t)ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )
)
dt. (80)
By virtue of vague convergence (as in the derivation of Lemma 1) of the product measure
×Ni=1u
i,α to ×Ni=1u
i,o, and Doobs inequality together with Borel-Cantelli lemma, we have
P − ess supω∈Ω supt∈[0,T ] |Λ
o(t, ω)| < M for some finite M > 0, hence it is evident that for
every ε > 0 there exists an integer α1,ε sufficiently large, such that the absolute value of the
first term on the right hand side of equation (80) is less than ε/3 for all α ≥ α1,ε. Expressing
the last right hand side term in (80) as
E
∫
[0,T ]
(
Λo(t)ℓ(t, xo(t), uαt )− Λ
α(t)ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )
)
dt
= E
∫
[0,T ]
Λo(t)
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uαt )− ℓ(t, x
α(t), uαt )
)
dt+ E
∫
[0,T ]
(
Λo(t)− Λα(t)
)
ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )dt,
(81)
by Assumptions 3, (B1), (B2), in particular the continuity of ℓ in x uniformly in A(N), it
is easy to verify that there exists an integer α2,ε such that for all α ≥ α2,ε, the absolute
value of the first term on the right hand side of (81) is less than ε/3, and that by Lebesgue
Dominated convergence theorem, and Lemma 1 that there exists an integer α3,ε such that
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for all α ≥ α3,ε, the absolute value of the second term on the right hand side of (81) is less
than ε/3. By combining these observations we obtain the following inequality
E
∫
[0,T ]
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )dt ≤ ε+
∫
[0,T ]
ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )dt, ∀α ≥ α1,ε ∨ α2,ε ∨ α3,ε.
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, it follows from the above inequality that
E
∫
[0,T ]
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )dt ≤ lim inf
α
E
∫
[0,T ]
ℓ(t, xα(t), uαt )dt. (82)
Combining (79) and (82) we arrive at the conclusion that
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ lim inf
α
J(u1,α, u2,α, . . . , uN,α),
establishing lower semicontinuity of J(·) in the vague topology. Since U(N)rel [0, T ] is compact
in the product (vague) topology, J(·) attains its minimum on it. This proves the existence
of an optimal team decision from U(N)rel [0, T ]. Existence of an optimal PbP decision is shown
similarly.
Since our derivation of stochastic minimum principle (necessary conditions of optimality)
or stochastic Pontryagin’s minimum principle will be based on the martingale representation
approach, we state a version of Hilbert space semi martingale representation which can be
found in many references.
Definition 3. An Rn−valued random process {m(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said to be a square
integrable continuous FT−semi martingale if and only if it has a representation
m(t) = m(0) +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], (83)
for some v ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) and Σ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)) and for some Rn−valued
F0,0−measurable random variable m(0) having finite second moment. The set of all such
semi martingales is denoted by SM2([0, T ],Rn).
Introduce the following class of FT−semi martingales:
SM20([0, T ],R
n)
△
=
{
m : m(t) =
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
for v ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) and Σ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn))
}
.
(84)
Now we present the fundamental result which is utilized in the maximum principle derivation.
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Theorem 3. (Semi Martingale Representation) The class of semi martingales SM20([0, T ],R
n)
is a real linear vector space and it is a Hilbert space with respect to the norm topology
‖ m ‖SM20([0,T ],Rn) arising from
‖ m ‖2SM20([0,T ],Rn)
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
|v(t)|2Rndt+ E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt.
Moreover, the space SM20([0, T ],R
n) is isometrically isomorphic to the space
L2FT ([0, T ],R
n)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)).
Proof. The result is well-known and can be found in many textbooks.
4 Team and PbP Optimality Conditions
In this section, we consider relaxed DM strategies and we derive necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions for team optimality (see Problem 1), and we deduce analogous results
for PbP optimality (see Problem 2).
For the derivation of stochastic optimality conditions we shall require stronger regularity
conditions on the coefficients of the state and observation equations {f, σ, h}, and coefficients
in the reward function {ℓ, ϕ}. These are given below.
Assumptions 4. E|x(0)|2Rn <∞, (A
i, d), ∀i ∈ ZN are compact, the maps f, σ, ℓ, {hi, Di,
1
2 , ∀i ∈
ZN} are measurable in t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ is Borel measurable, defined by
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn), ϕ : Rn −→ R,
ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ R, hi : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rki, Di,
1
2 : [0, T ] −→ L(Rki,Rki),
(85)
for i = 1, . . . , N , and they satisfy the following conditions.
(C1) The maps {f, σ} are once continuously differentiable with respect to x ∈ Rn;
(C2) The first derivatives {fx, σx} are bounded uniformly on [0, T ]× Rn × A(N);
(C3) The maps {ℓ, ϕ} are once continuously differentiable with respect to x ∈ Rn, and there
exists a K > 0 such that(
1 + |x|2Rn
)−1
|ℓ(t, x, u)|R +
(
1 + |x|Rn
)−1
|ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn(
1 + |x|2Rn
)−1
|ϕ(x)|R +
(
1 + |x|Rn
)−1
|ϕx(x)|Rn ≤ K;
(C4) The map hi is once continuously differentiable with respect to x ∈ Rn, and {hi, hix}
are bounded uniformly on [0, T ]× Rn × A(N), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
(C5) Di,
1
2 is uniformly bounded, the inverse Di,−
1
2 exists and it is uniformly bounded, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
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4.1 Optimality Conditions Under Reference Probability Space-(
Ω,F,P
)
Next, we state and prove the optimality conditions by utilizing the augmented system (23)
and reward (24), under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
.
We define the Gateaux derivative of G with respect to the variable at the point (t, z, ν) ∈
[0, T ]× Rn+1 ×Ni=1 M1(A
i) in the direction η1 ∈ Rn+1 by
GX(t, z, ν; η1)
△
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
{
G(t, z + εη1, ν)−G(t, z, ν)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Clearly, for each column of G denoted by G(j), j = 1, . . . , m + k, the Gateaux derivative of
G(j) component wise is given by G
(j)
X (t, z, ν; η1) = G
(j)
X (t, z, ν)η1, t ∈ [0, T ].
In order to present the necessary conditions of optimality we need the so called variational
equation. Suppose uo
△
= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] denotes the optimal decision and
u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] any other decision. Since U
i
rel[0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , it is
clear that for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
ui,εt
△
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈ U
i
rel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Let Xε(·) ≡ Xε(·; uε(·)) and Xo(·) ≡ Xo(·; uo(·)) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) denote the
solutions of the system equation (23) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respectively. Consider
the limit
Z(t)
△
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
Xε(t)−Xo(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
We have the following result characterizing the variational process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumptions 4 hold. The process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is an element of
the Banach space B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) and it is the unique solution of the variational
stochastic differential equation
dZ(t) = FX(t, X
o(t), uot )Z(t)dt+GX(t, X
o(t), uot ;Z(t))dW (t)
+ F (t, Xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dt+G(t, X
o(t), ut − u
o
t )dW (t), Z(0) = 0. (86)
where
F (t, X, u− uo)
△
=
N∑
i=1
F (t, Xo, u−i,o, ui − ui,o), G(t, Xo, u− uo)
△
=
N∑
i=1
G(t, Xo, u−i,o, ui − ui,o),
having a continuous modification.
Proof. The derivation utilizes the statements of Lemma 1. Note that for t ∈ (0, T ], (86) is a
linear stochastic differential equation. Define the component vectors of (86) by
Z
△
= V ector{Z1, Z2}.
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Then
dZ1(t) = Z1(t)h∗(t, xo(t), uot )D
−1(t)dy(t) + Λo(t)h∗x(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z
2(t))D−1(t)dy(t)
+ Λo(t)h∗(t, xo(t), ut − u
o
t )D
−1(t)dy(t), Z1(0) = 0. (87)
dZ2(t) = fx(t, x
o(t), uot )Z
2(t)dt+ σx(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z
2(t))dW (t)
+ f(t, xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dt+ σ(t, x
o(t), ut − u
o
t )dW (t), Z
2(0) = 0. (88)
Let {Z2h(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the homogenous part of (88) given by
dZ2h(t) = fx(t, x
o(t), uot )Z
2
h(t)dt+ σx(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z
2
h(t))dW (t), Z
2
h(s) = ζ
2, t ∈ [s, T ]. (89)
By Assumptions 4 and Lemma 1 there is a unique solution {Z2h(t) : t ∈ [s, T ]} given by
Z2h(t) = Ψ
2(t, s)ζ2, t ∈ [s, T ],
where Ψ2(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is the random {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted transition operator for
the homogenous system. Since the derivatives of f and σ with respect to the state are
uniformly bounded, the transition operator Ψ2(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is uniformly P−a.s. bounded
(with values in the space of n× n matrices).
Consider now the non homogenous stochastic differential equation (88), then its solution is
given by
Z2(t) =
∫ t
0
Ψ2(t, s)dη2(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (90)
where {η2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the semi martingale given by the following stochastic differential
equation
dη2(t) =f(t, xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dt
+ σ(t, xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dW (t), η
2(0) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (91)
Note that {η2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a continuous square integrable {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted
semi martingale. The fact that it has continuous modification follows directly from the
representation (90) and the continuity of the semi martingale {η2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Similarly, let {Z1h(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the homogenous part of (87) given by
dZ1h(t) = Z
1
h(t)h
∗(t, xo(t), uot )D
−1(t)dy(t), Z1h(s) = ζ
1, t ∈ [s, T ]. (92)
By Assumptions 4 and Lemma 1 there is a unique solution {Z1h(t) : t ∈ [s, T ]} given by
Z1h(t) = Ψ
1(t, s)ζ, t ∈ [s, T ],
where Ψ1(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is the random {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted transition operator for the
homogenous system. Since h is uniformly bounded, the transition operator Ψ1(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ]
is uniformly P−a.s. bounded.
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Consider now the non homogenous stochastic differential equation (87), then its solution is
given by
Z1(t) =
∫ t
0
Ψ1(t, s)dη1(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (93)
where {η1(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the martingale given by the following stochastic differential
equation
dη1(t) =Λo(t)h∗x(t, x
o(t), uo;Z2(t))D−1(t)dy(t)
+ Λo(t)h∗(t, xo(t), ut − u
o
t )D
−1(t)dy(t), η1(0) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (94)
Note that
E|η1(t)|2 ≤2 E
∫ t
0
|Λo(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)hx(s, x
o(s), uos)|
2
Rk |Z
2(s)|2Rnds
+ 2 E
∫ t
0
|Λo(t)|2|D−
1
2 (s)h(s, xo(s), ut − u
o
t )|
2
Rkds,
≤2C1 E
∫ t
0
|Λo(t)|2|Z2(s)|2Rnds+ 2C2 E
∫ t
0
|Λo(t)|2ds, (95)
where the last inequality follows from Assumptions 4, (C4), (C5). Since by Lemma 1,
(2) Λu ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R), and by the previous calculations Z2 ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn), then
from (95) we deduce that η1 ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)), and {η1(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a continuous
square integrable {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted martingale. By invoking (93) we also obtain
that Z1 ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)).
Putting together Zh
△
= V ector{Z1h, Z
2
h}, η
△
= V ector{η1, η2} then for t ∈ (0, T ], the homoge-
nous part of (86) is a linear stochastic differential equation satisfying
dZh(t) = FX(t, X
o(t), uot )Zh(t)dt+GX(t, X
o(t), uot ;Zh(t))dW (t), Zh(s) = ζ, t ∈ [s, T ].
(96)
and by the properties of {Z1h(t), Z
2
h(t) : t ∈ [s, T ]} there is a unique solution {Zh(t) : t ∈
[s, T ]} given by
Zh(t) = Ψ(t, s)ζ, t ∈ [s, T ],
where Ψ(t, s) constructed from {Ψ1(t, s),Ψ2(t, s)}, t ∈ [s, T ] is the random {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]}−adapted transition operator for the homogenous system of (86).
The solution of the non homogenous stochastic differential equation (86), is given by
Z(t) =
∫ t
0
Ψ(t, s)dη(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (97)
where {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the semi martingale given by the following stochastic differential
equation
dη(t) =F (t, Xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dt
+G(t, Xo(t), ut − u
o
t )dW (t), η(0) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (98)
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By the properties of {η1, η2} then
{
η(t) ≡ V ector{η1(t), η2(t)} : t ∈ [0, T ]
}
is a contin-
uous square integrable {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted semi martingale. The fact that it has
continuous modification follows directly from the representation (97) and the continuity of
martingale and semi martingale {η1(t), η2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
By constructing the difference Z˜ǫ(t)
△
= 1
ǫ
(
Xε(t)−Xo(t)
)
−Z(t) and then utilizing Assump-
tions 4, and Lemma 1, it can be shown that in the limit, as ε −→ 0, Z˜ǫ converges to zero in
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)).
Remark 2. Note that
GX(t, X, u;Z) dW ≡
k+m∑
j=1
G
(j)
X (t, X, u)ZdW j,
G(t, X, u− u¯) dW ≡
k+m∑
j=1
G(j)(t, X, u− u¯)dW j .
where G(j) is the jth column of G, and G
(j)
X is the derivatives of G
(j) with respect to X,
j = 1, 2, . . . , k +m.
Before we give the main theorems we introduce the augmented Hamiltonian system of
equations corresponding to (23) and (24).
Define the Hamiltonian of the augmented system
Hrel : [0, T ]× Rn+1 × Rn+1 × L(Rm+k,Rn+1)×M1(A
(N)) −→ R
Hrel(t, X,Ψ, Q, u)
△
= 〈F (t, X, u),Ψ〉+ tr
(
Q∗G(t, X, u)
)
+ L(t, X, u), t ∈ [0, T ]. (99)
For any u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], the adjoint process (Ψ, Q) ∈ L
2
FT
([0, T ],Rn+1)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m+k,Rn+1))
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equations
dΨ(t) = −F ∗X(t, X(t), ut)Ψ(t)dt− VQ(t)dt− LX(t, X(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ),
= −HrelX (t, X(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), Ψ(T ) = ΦX(X(T )), (100)
where VQ ∈ L
2
FT
([0, T ],Rn+1) is given by
〈VQ(t), ζ〉 = tr
(
Q∗(t)GX(t, X(t), ut; ζ)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Clearly,
VQ(t) =
k+m∑
j=1
(
G
(j)
X (t, X(t), ut)
)∗
Q(j)(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (101)
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The state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation (23) expressed in terms of the
Hamiltonian as follows.
dX(t) = HrelΨ (t, X(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+G(t, X(t), ut)dW (t), X(0) = X0, t ∈ (0, T ].
(102)
Next, we state the first set of optimality conditions for an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with
the corresponding augmented solution Xo ≡ (Λo, xo) to be team optimal.
Theorem 4. (Team Optimality Necessary Conditions under Reference Measure P)
Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 4.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
Xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20([0, T ],R
n+1) with the intensity process
(Ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m+k,Rn+1)).
(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ]. (103)
Moreover, (103) holds if and only if the following variation inequality holds.
E
{∫ T
0
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(104)
(3) The process (Ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,+kRn+1)) is a unique solution
of the backward stochastic differential equation (100) such that uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] satisfies
the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras Gy
i
0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈
[0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i)|Gy
i
0,t
}
≥ E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
yi
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N (105)
Proof. (1). The derivation utilizes the variational equation of Lemma 2 and the semi mar-
tingale representation stated under Theorem 3. We describe the initial steps. Suppose
uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is an optimal team decision and u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] any other admissible decision.
Since Uirel[0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , we have, for any ε ∈ [0, 1], u
i,ε
t
△
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈
Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . Let X
ε(·) ≡ Xε(·; uε(·)), Xo(·) ≡ Xo(·; uo(·)) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1))
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denote the solutions of the stochastic system (23) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respec-
tively. Since uo(·) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is optimal it is clear that
J(uε)− J(uo) ≥ 0, ∀ε ∈ [0, 1], ∀u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ]. (106)
Define the Gateaux differential of J at uo in the direction u− uo by
dJ(uo, u− u0)
△
= lim
ε↓0
J(uε)− J(uo)
ε
≡
d
dε
J(uε)|ε=0.
It can be shown that
dJ(uo, u− u0) = L(Z) +
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
L(t, Xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ],(107)
where L(Z) is given by the functional
L(Z) = E
{∫ T
0
LX(t, X
o(t), uot ), Z(t)〉 dt+ 〈ΦX(X
o(T )), Z(T )〉
}
. (108)
Under measure P, the filtration {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is generated by the initial state X(0), and
the augmented Brownian motion vector {(W (t), B(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and by Lemma 2, the
process Z(·) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) and it is continuous P−a.s.
Hence, by Assumptions 4, it follows that Z −→ L(Z) is a continuous linear functional.
Further, by Lemma 2, η −→ Z is a continuous linear map from the Hilbert space SM20[0, T ]
to the space B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) given by the expression (97). Thus the composition
map η −→ Z −→ L(Z) ≡ L˜(η) is a continuous linear functional on SM20[0, T ]. Then by
virtue of Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert spaces, there exists a semi martingalemo ∈
SM20([0, T ],R
n+1) with intensity (ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1) × L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m+k,Rn+1))
such that
L(Z)
△
= L˜(η) =(mo, η)SM20([0,T ],Rn+1) =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈Ψo(t), F (t, Xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
tr
(
Qo,∗(t)G(t, Xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )
)
dt. (109)
This proves (1).
(2) Substituting (109) into (107) we obtain the following variational equation.
dJ(uo, u− u0) =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈Ψo(t), F (t, Xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
tr
(
Qo,∗(t)G(t, Xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )
)
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
L(t, Xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. (110)
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By the definition of the Hamiltonian (99), it follows that inequality (110) is precisely (103)
along with the pair {(ψo(t), Qo(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. Next, we show that (103) implies (104).
Define
gi(T, ω)
△
=
∫ T
0
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt, ∀u
i ∈ Uirel[0, T ], i = 0, 1, . . . , N.
(111)
Suppose for some i ∈ ZN , (104) does not hold, and let Ai(T )
△
= {ω : gi(T, ω) < 0}. Let νi
be any vaguely {Gy
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted ν
i ∈M1(Ai). We can choose uit in (103) as
uit
△
=
{
νi on Ai(T )
ui,ot outside A
i(T )
(112)
together with ujt = u
j,o
t , j 6= i, j ∈ ZN . Substituting (112) in (103) we arrive at
∫
Ai(T )
gi(T, ω)dP(ω) ≥
0, which contradicts the definition of Ai(T ), unless Ai(T ) has measure zero. Hence, (103)
implies (104). On the other hand, it is clear that (104) implies (103). Thus, (103) and (104)
are equivalent.
(3). Following the same steps in derivation found in [44] for noiseless information structures,
we verify that the process (Ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,+kRn+1)) is a unique
solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (100).
Next, we show (105). By using the property of conditional expectation then
E
{∫ T
0
E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )|G
yi
0,t
}
dt
}
≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ], i ∈ ZN .
(113)
Let t ∈ (0, T ), ω ∈ Ω and ε > 0, and consider the sets I iε ≡ [t, t+ ε] ⊂ [0, T ] and Ω
i
ε(⊂ Ω) ∈
Gy
i
0,t containing ω such that |I
i
ε| → 0 and P(Ω
i
ε) → 0 as ε → 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . For any
sub-sigma algebra G ⊂ F, let P|G denote the restriction of the probability measure P on to
the σ-algebra G. For any (vaguely) Gy
i
0,t−adapted ν
i ∈M1(Ai), construct
uit =
{
νi for (t, ω) ∈ I iε × Ω
i
ε
ui,ot otherwise
i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (114)
Clearly, it follows from the above construction that ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ]. Substituting (114) in
(113) we obtain the following inequality∫
Ωiε×I
i
ε
E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t),Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i − ui,ot )|G
yi
0,t
}
dt ≥ 0,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(115)
39
Letting |I iε| denote the Lebesgue measure of the set I
i
ε and dividing the above expression by
the product measure P(Ωiε)|I
i
ε| and letting ε→ 0 we arrive at the following inequality.
E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i)|Gy
i
0,t
}
≥ E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i,o
t )|G
yi
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (116)
This completes the proof of (3).
The following remark can be used to identify the martingale part of the adjoint process.
Remark 3. Suppose the additional assumptions hold: f, σ, h, ℓ, ϕ are twice continuously
differentiable and uniformly bounded. By an application of the Riesz representation theorem
for Hilbert space martingales, we identify, the martingale term of the adjoint process Mt =∫ t
0
ΨoX(s)G(s,X
o(s))dW (s), dual to the first martingale term in the variational equation (86).
Hence, Q in the adjoint equation, is identified by Q(t) ≡ ΨX(t)G(t, X(t), ut).
Alternative Hamiltonian System on
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
An alternative representation of the Hamiltonian system of equations is obtained as
follows.
Define the following quantities6
Ψ
△
=
[
Ψ1
Ψ2
]
, Q
△
=
[
q11 q12
q21 q22
]
,
Ψ1 ∈ R, Ψ2 ∈ Rn, q11 ∈ L(Rk,R), q12 ∈ L(Rm,R), q21 ∈ L(Rk,Rn), q22 ∈ L(Rm,Rn).
Then an equivalent Hamiltonian system of equations under the reference measure P is given
below. The Hamiltonian is equivalently expressed as
Hrel(t, X(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut) =〈f(t, x(t), ut),Ψ2(t)〉+ Λ(t)ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
+ tr
(
q∗22(t)σ(t, x(t), ut)
)
+ Λ(t)tr
(
q∗11h
∗(t, x(t), ut)
)}
(117)
≡Hrel(t, x(t),Λ(t),Ψ2(t), q11(t), q22(t), ut), (118)
the adjoint processes {Ψ1,Ψ2, q11, q21, q12, q22} satisfy the equations
dΨ1(t) =− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ q12(t)dW (t)
+ q11(t)
(
dy(t)− h(t, x(t), ut)dt
)
, Ψ1(T ) = ϕ(x(t)), t ∈ [0, T ), (119)
dΨ2(t) =− f
∗
x(t, x(t), ut)Ψ2(t)dt− Λ(t)ℓx(t, x(t), ut)dt+ q22(t)dW (t)
− Λ(t)Vq11(t)dt− Vq22(t)dt+ q21(t)dy(t), Ψ2(T ) = Λ(T )ϕx(x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ),
(120)
6We redefine q11 ≡ q11D
− 1
2 , q21 ≡ q21D
− 1
2 without changing the notation.
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where Vq11 , Vq22 are given by
〈Vq11(t), ζ〉 =tr(q
∗
11(t)h
∗(t, x(t), ut; ζ)) = 〈q11(t)hx(t, x(t), ut), ζ〉, t ∈ [0, T ], (121)
〈Vq22(t), ζ〉 =tr(q
∗
22(t)σ(t, x(t), ut; ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ], (122)
the state equations are given by
dΛ(t) =Λ(t)h∗(t, x(t), ut)D
−1(t)dy(t), Λ(0) = 1, t ∈ (0, T ]. (123)
dx(t) =f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (124)
and the conditional variational Hamiltonian (equivalent of (105)) is given by
E
{
Hrel(t, xo(t),Λo(t),Ψo2(t), q
o
11(t), q
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , ν
i − ui,ot )|G
yi
0,t
}
≥ 0,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (125)
The previous system of equations (117)-(125) describe the maximum principle under the
reference probability measure P.
Next, we deduce as expected that the optimality conditions (necessary) for a uo ∈
U(N)rel [0, T ] to be a PbP optimal can be derived following the procedure of Theorem 4, and that
these conditions are the same to the conditions of team optimality, with a minor difference.
These results are stated as a Corollary.
Corollary 1. (PbP Necessary Conditions Under Reference Measure P)
Consider Problem 2 under Assumptions 4.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+1)) to be a PbP optimal strategy, it is necessary that the statements
of Theorem 4, (1), (3) hold and statement (2) is replaced by
(2’) The variational inequalities are satisfied:
E
∫ T
0
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u
i ∈ Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
(126)
Proof. The derivation is based on the procedure of Theorem 4, but we only vary in the
direction uit − u
i,o
t , while the rest of the strategies are optimal, u
−i
t = u
−i,o
t .
Clearly, every team optimal strategy for Problem 1 is a PbP optimal strategy for Problem 2,
hence PbP optimality is a weaker notion than team optimality as expected. By comparing
the statements of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1, it is clear that the necessary conditions for
team optimality and PbP optimality are equivalent.
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Remark 4. (Centralized Information Structures)
From Theorem 4 one can deduce the optimality conditions of the classical centralized partially
observable control problems, that is, when at each t ∈ [0, T ], ut is a stochastic kernel measur-
able with respect to the centralized noisy information GI0,t ⊆ G
y
0,t. The necessary conditions
for such a uo to be optimal are
E
{
Hrel(t, Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), ν)|GI0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, Xo(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), uot )|G
I
0,t
}
,
∀ν ∈M1(A
(N)), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|GI0,t − a.s., (127)
where {Xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are the solutions of (100), (102).
For centralized information structure GI0,t = G
y
0,t a maximum principle is derive in [54,55,57],
and for risk-sensitive pay-offs in [42].
4.2 Optimality Conditions Under Original Probability Space-
(
Ω,F,Pu
)
Next, we prepare to express the optimality conditions of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 with
respect to the original probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, starting with the
explicit representation of the optimality conditions under the reference measure P, described
by (117)-(125).
Define
ψ
△
= Λ−1Ψ2, κ˜21
△
= Λ−1
(
q21 −Ψ2h
∗D−1
)
, q˜21
△
= Λ−1q21, q˜22 = Λ
−1q22. (128)
Utilizing (128) the Hamiltonian (117) is given by
Hrel(t, X(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut) =Λ
u(t)
{
〈f(t, x(t), ut), ψ(t)〉+ ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
+ tr
(
q˜∗22(t)σ(t, x(t), ut)
)
+ tr
(
q∗11h
∗(t, x(t), ut)
)}
. (129)
Since the right hand side of (129) is multiplied by the Radon-Nikodym derivative Λu = dP
u
dP ,
then as we have done in the previous subsection, we can express the Hamiltonian system of
equations under the original probability Pu, using the fact that under the original probability
measure Pu, the process Bu(t) =
∫ t
0
D−
1
2 (s)
(
dy(s) − h(s, x(s))
)
ds is an {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
standard Brownian motion.
Define the alternative Hamiltonian
Hrel : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × L(Rk,R)× L(Rm,Rn)×M1(A
(N)) −→ R
by
Hrel(t, x, ψ, q11, q˜22, u)
△
= 〈f(t, x, u), ψ〉+ ℓ(t, x, u) + tr
(
q˜∗22σ(t, x, u)
)
+ tr
(
q∗11h
∗(t, x, u)
)
.
(130)
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By invoking the Itoˆ differential rule to ψ(·)
△
= Λ−1(·)Ψ2(·) we can derive the backward
stochastic differential equation for ψ(·). Under the original probability measure
(
Ω,F, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, the minimum principe is given is given in terms of the new Hamiltonian
(130) as follows.
The adjoint processes {ψ, q11, q12, q˜21, q˜22} (k˜21 is not included because it is redundant) satisfy
the Backward stochastic differential equations
dΨ1(t) =− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ q12(t)dW (t) + q11(t)D
1
2 (t)dBu(t), Ψ1(T ) = ϕ(x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ),
(131)
dψ(t) =− f ∗x(t, x(t), ut)ψ(t)dt− ℓx(t, x(t), ut)dt− Vq˜22(t)dt− Vq11(t)dt
+ q˜22(t)dW (t) + k˜21(t)D
1
2 (t)dBu(t),
=−Hrelx (t, x(t), ψ(t), q11(t), q˜22(t), ut) + q˜22(t)dW (t)
+ k˜21(t)D
1
2 (t)dBu(t), ψ(T ) = ϕx(x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ), (132)
the state process satisfies the forward stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = Hrelψ (t, x(t), ψ(t), q11(t), q˜22(t), ut) + σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ].(133)
Hence, under the original probability measure Pu the conditional variational Hamiltonian is
given by
Eu
o
{
Hrel(t, xo(t),ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , ν
i)|Gy
i
0,t
}
≥ Eu
o
{
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t )|G
yi
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈ M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], Pu
o
|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (134)
Thus, under the original probability measure
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, the adjoint pro-
cesses are weakly defined with respect to the filtration {F0,t ≡ B(Rn)⊗FW0,t⊗F
y
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Consequently, we can choose to apply the optimality conditions either under measure P or Pu.
We can now state the following necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality under the
original probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
.
Theorem 5. (Team Optimality Conditions under Original Measure Pu)
Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 4.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20([0, T ],R
n+1) (n + 1− with the intensity
process {(Ψo1, ψ
o),
[
qo11 q
o
12
q˜o21 q˜
o
22
]
} ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m+k,Rn+1)).
(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
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N∑
i=1
Eu
o
{∫ T
0
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ].
(135)
Moreover, (135) holds if and only if the following variational inequality holds.
Eu
o
{∫ T
0
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
(136)
(3) The process {(Ψo1, ψ
o),
[
qo11 q
o
12
q˜o21 q˜
o
22
]
} ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n+1) × L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,+kRn+1)) is
a unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (131), (132) such
that uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] satisfies the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to the
σ-algebras Gy
i
0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ] :
Eu
o
{
Hrel(t, xo(t),ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
−i,o
t , ν
i)|Gy
i
0,t
}
≥ Eu
o
{
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
o
t )|G
yi
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],Pu
o
|
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N (137)
Sufficient Conditions. Let (xo(·), uo(·)) denote an admissible state and decision pair
and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes. Suppose the following conditions
hold.
(C6) Hrel(t, ·, ψ, q11, q˜22, ν), t ∈ [0, T ] is convex in x ∈ Rn;
(C7) ϕ(·) is convex in x ∈ Rn.
Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is a relaxed team optimal if it satisfies (137).
For a generic information structure {I i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} available to each DM i, generating
a σ−algebra GI
i(t) △= σ
{
I i(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], which is not necessarily nested (nonclassical), in
the sense that, GI
i(t) * GI
i(τ), τ > t (see Remark 6) the conditioning in (137) is taken with
respect to GI
i(t), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Proof. Necessary Conditions. This follows from the discussion prior to the statement of
the Theorem.
Sufficient Conditions. Let uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] denote a candidate for the optimal team
decision and u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] any other decision. Then
J(uo)− J(u) = Eu
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt+
(
ϕ(xo(T ))− ϕ(x(T ))
)}
. (138)
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By the convexity of ϕ(·) then
ϕ(x(T ))− ϕ(xo(T )) ≥ 〈ϕx(x
o(T )), x(T )− xo(T )〉. (139)
Substituting (139) into (138) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ Eu
{
〈ϕx(x
o(T )), xo(T )− x(T )〉
}
+Eu
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt
}
. (140)
Applying the Ito differential rule to 〈ψo, x − xo〉 on the interval [0, T ] and then taking ex-
pectation we obtain the following equation.
Eu
{
〈ψo(T ), x(T )− xo(T )〉
}
= Eu
{
〈ψo(0), x(0)− xo(0)〉
}
+ Eu
{∫ T
0
〈−f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt− Vq˜o22(t)− Vqo11(t)− ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
}
+ Eu
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ Eu
{∫ T
0
tr
(
q˜∗,o22 (t)σ(t, x(t), ut)− q˜
∗,o
22 (t)σ(t, x
o(t), uot
)
dt
}
= −Eu
{∫ T
0
〈Hrelx (t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
o
t ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
+ Eu
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ Eu
{∫ T
0
tr
(
q˜∗,o22 (t)σ(t, x(t), ut)− q˜
∗,o
22 (t)σ(t, x
o(t), uot )
)
dt
}
(141)
Note that ψo(T ) = ϕx(x
o(T )). Substituting (141) into (140) we obtain
J(uo)− J(u) ≤Eu
{∫ T
0
[
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t )−H
rel(t, x(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), ut)
]
dt
}
−Eu
{∫ T
0
〈Hrelx (t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t ), x
o(t)− x(t)〉dt
}
. (142)
Since by hypothesis Hrel is convex in x ∈ Rn and linear in ν ∈M1(A(N)), then
Hrel(t, x(t),ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), ut)−H
rel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t )
≥
N∑
i=1
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
−i,o
t , u
i − ui,ot )
+〈Hrelx (t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉, t ∈ [0, T ] (143)
Substituting (143) into (142) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ −Eu
{ N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
. (144)
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By (137) and the definition of conditional expectation we have
Eu
o
{
IAit(ω)H
rel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )
}
= Eu
o
{
IAit(ω)E
uo
{
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )|G
yi
0,t
}}
≥ 0, ∀Ait ∈ G
yi
0,t, i ∈ ZN .
(145)
Hence, Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t−u
i,o
t ) ≥ 0, ∀u
i
t ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],Pu
o
−
a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Substituting the this inequality into (144) gives
J(uo) ≤ J(u), ∀u ∈ U(N)[0, T ].
Hence, sufficiency of (137) is shown.
The last statement is obvious.
Note that the global convexity conditions (C6), (C7) are precisely the conditions of-
ten used to show sufficiency of the necessary conditions for centralized information structures.
For PbP optimality we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. (PbP Optimality Conditions under Pu)
Consider Problem 2 under Assumptions 4.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be a relaxed PbP optimal strategy, it is necessary that the
statements of Theorem 5, (1), (3) hold and statement (2) is replaced by
(2’) The variational inequalities are satisfied:
Eu
o
∫ T
0
Hrel(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22, u
−i,o
t , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u
i ∈ Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
(146)
Sufficient Conditions. Let (xo(·), uo(·)) denote an admissible state and control pair and
let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes. Suppose the conditions the conditions of The-
orem 5, (C6), (C7) hold.
Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is PbP optimal if it satisfies (137).
Proof. Necessary Conditions. The methodology is similar to that of Theorem 5, with the
exception that we only vary in the direction ui − ui,o while all other strategies assume their
optimal values.
Sufficient Conditions. This is precisely as done in Theorem 5.
Therefore, under the global convexity conditions (C6), (C7), we deduce that PbP opti-
mality implies team optimality.
In specific examples one may invoke the maximum principle to derive the optimal decen-
tralized strategies under the original probability space Pu given by (130)-(134), or under the
reference probability space P given by (117)-(125).
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5 Team Optimality Conditions for Regular Strategies
In this section, we illustrate how the optimality conditions derived based on relaxed strategies
can be reduced to optimality conditions based regular strategies.
Suppose optimal regular team and PbP strategies exist from the admissible class U(N)reg [0, T ] ⊂
U(N)rel [0, T ]. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions presented in the previous section
can be specialized to the class of decision strategies which are simply Dirac measures con-
centrated {uot : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ]. Specifically, consider the class of regular deci-
sions U(N)reg [0, T ], where the sets Ai are compact subsets of Rdi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. This class of
regular decisions embeds continuously into the class of relaxed decisions through the map
u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] −→ δut(ω) ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. Clearly, for every g ∈ L
1
GT
([0, T ]× Ω, C(Ai)) we have
E
∫
[0,T ]×Ai
g(t, ω, ξ)δuit(ω)(dξ)dt = E
∫
[0,T ]
g(t, ω, uit(ω))dt, ∀i ∈ ZN . (147)
The important advantage of the theory of relaxed strategies is that the necessary conditions
of optimality for regular strategies follow readily from those of relaxed strategies, without
having to repeat the derivations.
Thus, by simply replacing the relaxed strategies by Dirac measures, from previous section
we obtain the following Hamiltonian (corresponding to regular strategies)
Hreg : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn ×L(Rk,R)× L(Rm,Rn)× A(N) −→ R,
where
Hreg(t, x, ψ, q11, q˜22, u)
△
= 〈f(t, x, u), ψ〉+ ℓ(t, x, u) + tr
(
q˜∗22σ(t, x, u)
)
+ tr
(
q∗11h
∗(t, x, u)
)
,
(148)
and the Hamiltonian system of equations is given by (131)-(133), with relaxed strategies
replaced by regular strategies u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ].
Theorem 6. (Regular team optimality conditions) Consider Problem 1 under the Assump-
tions of Theorem 5 with admissible decisions from the regular class taking values in Ai, a
closed, bounded and convex subset of Rdi, ∀i ∈ ZN .
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) Statement (1) of Theorem 5 holds.
(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
N∑
i=1
Eu
o
∫ T
0
Hreg(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t)dt
≥
N∑
i=1
Eu
o
∫ T
0
Hreg(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t )
)
dt, ∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. (149)
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(3) The process {(Ψo1, ψ
o), (qo11, q
o
12, q˜
o
21, q˜
o
22)} ∈ L
2
FT ([0, T ],R
n+1)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m+k,Rn+1))
is a unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (131), (132), with
Hrel replaced by Hreg such that uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] satisfies the point wise almost sure
inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras Gy
i
0,t, t ∈ [0, T ] :
Eu
o
{(
Hreg(t, xo(t),ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
−i,o
t , u
i
t)−H
reg(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), q˜
o
22(t), u
o
t )
)
|Gy
i
0,t
}
≥ 0,
∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|u
o
Gy
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (150)
Sufficient Conditions. Let (uo(·), xo(·)) denote an admissible decision and state pair and
ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the conditions (C7) holds and in addition
(C8) f, σ, h, ℓ are continuously differentiable in u ∈ A(N) and uniformly bounded;
(C9) Hreg(t, ·, ψ, q11, q˜22, ·), t ∈ [0, T ], is convex in (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N);
Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is optimal if it satisfies (150).
Proof. The necessary conditions follow from Theorem 5 by simply replacing relaxed strategies
by Dirac measures concentrated at uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. The derivation of sufficient conditions is
done precisely as in Theorem 5, by using the additional condition (C8).
Person-by-person optimality conditions for regular decision strategies follow from their
relaxed counterparts, as discussed above.
5.1 Realization of Relaxed by Regular Strategies
The existence of optimal relaxed strategies shown in Theorem 2 does not assume convexity
of the actions spaces Ai, i = 1, . . . , N . Since is some applications of stochastic dynamic team
theory, it is often desirable and easier to construct regular team strategies, next we address
the question of whether a regular team strategy with corresponding team pay-off is close to
that realized by an optimal relaxed team strategy. To this end, we have the following result.
Theorem 7. Consider the regular team strategies U(N)reg [0, T ], where A(N) is closed and
bounded, but not necessarily convex. Suppose the assumptions of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2
hold, and consider the team problem stated in Problem 1.
Let uo ∈ U(N)rel be the optimal relaxed team strategy. Then, for every ε > 0 there exists a
regular team strategy control ur ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] such that
J(ur) ≤ ε+ J(u
o).
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Proof. Since U(N)rel [0, T ] ≡ L
∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ]×Ω,M1(A(N))) ⊂ L∞
Gy
i
T
([0, T ]×Ω,M(A(N))) is compact
in the vague topology (that is weak star topology) and convex (by the convexity ofM1(U)),
it follows from the well known Krein-Millman theorem that
U(N)rel [0, T ] = cl
vconv(ext(U(N)rel [0, T ])),
i.e. U(N)rel [0, T ] is the weak star closed convex hull of its extreme points. By considering the
embedding U(N)reg [0, T ] →֒ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], it can be verified that the extreme points of U
(N)
rel [0, T ]
are precisely the set of regular strategies U(N)reg [0, T ] through the map u ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] −→ δu ∈
U(N)rel [0, T ]. Thus, if u
o ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is the optimal (relaxed) strategy there exists a sequence
{un} of the form
un ≡
n∑
i=1
αni ui, ui ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ], α
n
i ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
αni = 1, n ∈ N
such that un
v
−→ uo. Let {Xn, Xo} ⊂ B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,R
n+1)) denote the solutions of the
augmented system (23) corresponding to {un, uo} respectively. By Lemma 1, along a subse-
quence if necessary, it follows that Xn
s
−→ Xo in B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,R
n+1)). Consequently, it
follows from continuity of L and Φ in the augmented state variable X , Assumptions 3, (B1)-
(B3), and Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem that limn→∞ J(u
n) = J(uo). Note that
for every n ∈ N , un ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], and so, for every ε > 0, there exists an nε ∈ N such
that |J(un) − J(uo)| < ε for all n ≥ nε. Taking ur = u
nε we have J(ur) ≤ ε + J(u
o). This
completes the derivation.
Remark 5. By the previous theorem an ǫ-optimal team strategy can be found from the class
of regular strategies (measurable functions with values in A(N)), though the limit of such
strategies may be a relaxed. More specifically, if Ai ⊂ Rdi consists of a finite set of points,
it is clearly non-convex, and optimal team strategies may not exist from the class of regular
strategies U(N)reg [0, T ] based on the set Ai. However, optimal relaxed team strategies do exist. In
this case the sequence of regular strategiesa pproximating the optimal relaxed strategies may
oscillate violently between the finite set of points of Ai with increasing frequency (converging
to infinity). This is known as chattering.
Remark 6. (General Information Structures) The optimality conditions apply to many other
forms information structures. We describe two such generalization.
Nested Information Structures. Suppose each team members actions uit at time t ∈ [0, T ]
is a nonanticipative measurable function of the noisy observations {yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
and delayed noisy observations {yj(s − ǫj) : ǫj > 0, j ∈ O(j), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, of any subset
O(i) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N} of the rest of observations which are communicated to
member i, for i = 1, . . . , N . Let GI
i
0,t
△
= σ
{
I i(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
denote the minimum σ−algebra
generated by
{
I i(s)
△
= {yi(s), yj(s− ǫj) : ǫj > 0, j ∈ O(i)} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], the infor-
mation available to uit, at t ∈ [0, T ], for i = 1, . . . , N . Clearly, G
Ii
0,t is a nested information
structure since GI
i
0,t ⊆ G
Ii
0,τ , ∀τ > t.
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Nonnested Information Structures. Suppose each team members actions uit at time
t ∈ [0, T ] is a measurable function of I i(t)
△
= {yi(t), yj(t − ǫj) : ǫj > 0, j ∈ O(i)}. Let
GI
i(t) △= σ
{
I i(t)} denote the minimum σ−algebra generated by I i(t), t ∈ [0, T ], the informa-
tion available to uit, at t ∈ [0, T ], for i = 1, . . . , N .
Clearly, GI
i(t) is a nonnested (nonclassical) information structure since GI
i(t) * GI
i(τ), ∀τ > t.
For such information structures the conditioning of the Hamiltonian is replaced by the con-
ditioning with respect to GI
i
0,t or G
Ii(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
This completes our analysis on team and PbP optimality conditions for decision sys-
tems with decentralized noisy information structures. We point out that the challenge is in
the implementation of the new variational Hamiltonians and the computation the optimal
decentralized strategies for specific examples.
In future work we will we investigate applications of the results of this part to specific
linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic differential decision systems from Communication
and Control areas as in [45].
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented two methods which generalize static team theory to dynamic
team theory, in the context of continuous-time stochastic differential decentralized decision
problems, with relaxed and regular decentralized team strategies. Both methods utilize Gir-
sanov’s measure tranformation to transform the original problem to an equivalent problem
under a reference probabiity space, in which the observations and/or the unobserved state
are not affected by any of the team decisions. The first generalizes and makes precise Witsen-
hausen’s [1] notion of equivalence between static and dynamic team problems. The second
method is based on Pontryagin’s minimum principle and consists of forward and backward
stochastic differential equations, and a conditional Hamiltonian with respect to the infor-
mation structure available to each team player. We also show existence of team and PbP
optimality among the class of relaxed decentralized strategies.
The methodology is very general; it is applicable to variety of examples, including nonlinear
stochastic differential team problems, and it is easily generalized to other systems and games.
Below, we provide a short list of additional generalizations and issues which can be further
investigated.
(F1) For team problems with regular decentralized strategies with non-convex action spaces
Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and diffusion coefficients which depend on the decision variables
it is necessary to derive optimality conditions based on second-order variations. If
one considers our function spaces, then the extra equation coming from second order
variations, then the modified conditional Hamiltonian can be easily obtained as in [62].
(F2) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used in other type of games such as
Nash-equilibrium strategies with different information structures for each player, and
minimax games.
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(F3) The derivation of optimality conditions can be extended to differential systems driven
by both continuous Brownian motion processes and jump processes, such as Le´vy or
Poisson jump processes. If one invokes our spaces then this generalization follows
directly from [50].
(F4) The Pontryagin’s optimality conditions obtained for continuous systems can be easily
transformed to analogous optimality conditions for discrete-time systems, by invoking
the discrete-time Girsanov’s measure transformation, the semi martingale and Riesz
representation theorems for discrete-time Hilbert processes. This direction is worth
pursuing to gain additional insight into decentralized decision making.
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